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This dissertation explores the relevance of Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue for the 
theory and practice of psychotherapy. In particular, Buber's distinction between I-Thou 
and I-It modes of relating, his understanding of sickness and healing as occurring in the 
"between" of relation, and his thoughts on psychotherapy are examined. It is argued that 
his work in these areas can make a contribution to the field of psychotherapy by 
providing a broad, coherent relational philosophy in which to place many of the insights 
of different schools of psychotherapy, while also helping to provide an understanding of 
the source of some of the current debates and tensions within the field. The contribution 
that Buber's work can make to key theoretical questions in psychotherapy, such as the 
unit of study in therapy, the goal and direction of therapy, and the agent of change and 
healing are explored. The challenges that Buber's concept of "healing through meeting" 
presents to orthodox psychoanalytic theory is examined, together with the 
correspondence between his work and recent trends within psychoanalytic theory towards 
a more relational approach. Further, some guidelines for the practice of psychotherapy 
are examined. Buber's concept ofthe therapist's need for "existential trust" and his/her 
ability to see the patient as a whole unique person are explored, together with the blocks 
to dialogue and meeting in the therapy relationship that are created by both the therapist 
and psychoanalytic theory. The thesis ends with a critique of Buber and an examination 
of the relevance of his philosophy for both psychotherapy and wider social issues in the 
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Martin Buber was, as Friedman (1976) argues, a seminal thinker. His thoughts have left 
us a rich legacy upon which to build in many different disciplines. In the field of 
psychotherapy, Buber's work has influenced some of the field's founding figures and 
most innovative thinkers, such as Carl lung, Erich Fromm, Carl Rogers, Fritz Perls, 
Harry Guntrip, RD Laing, Leslie Farber, and Irving Yalom (see Friedman, 1985, 1992a). 
Yet despite the pioneering work of Maurice Friedman (1976, 1985, 1988, 1992a, 1992b, 
1996), the world's most foremost authority on Buber, and other psychotherapists such as 
Farber (1956, 1966) and Trub (1964), there have not been many systematic studies of 
how Buber's ideas can contribute to the theory and practice of psychotherapy. However, 
in recent times this appears to be changing and a school of psychotherapy strongly 
influenced by Buber's work, termed the "dialogical psychotherapists" by Friedman 
(1992a), has slowly emerged and has begun to apply his philosophy to the practice of 
psychotherapy [Hycner (1991, 1996), Gunzburg (1985), Heard (1993), DeLeo (1996), 
Friedman (1992), Boszormenyi-Nagy (1986,1996), Kron (1996)]. 
This thesis attempts to provide a further contribution to this growing literature on the 
application of Buber's philosophy of dialogue to the field of psychotherapy. Indeed, 
Buber was, as the thesis will show, greatly interested in psychotherapy and he was the 
first to examine the implications of his philosophy for the field. This thesis argues that 
Buber's philosophy and ideas on psychotherapy can make a contribution to the field of 
psychotherapy by providing a broad, coherent relational philosophy in which to place 
many of the insights of different schools of psychotherapy, while also helping to provide 
an understanding of the source of some of the current debates and tensions within the 
field. In this respect it is Buber's distinction between "I-It" and "I-Thou" relationships, 
his notion of the "between" of relation as the primary category of human reality, and his 
understanding of healing as emerging from "meeting" that provide the center from which 











Therefore the thesis aims to do three things: 1) To explain Buber's philosophy of 
dialogue and his distinction between "I-Thou and "I-It" relations. 2) To explore his 
thoughts on psychotherapy. 3) To explore the implications of his work for the theory and 
practice of psychotherapy. In terms of theory, the implications of Buber's philosophy for 
key theoretical questions in the field of psychotherapy, such as the question of what 
constitutes human health and illness, the goal and direction of psychotherapy, and the 
agent of change and healing in therapy are explored, together with the challenges that 
Buber's work brings to some of the traditional notions within therapy. Areas of 
correspondence between Buber's ideas and recent theoretical trends that have emerged in 
the field have also been highlighted. In terms of the implications of Buber's philosophy 
for the practice of psychotherapy, the thesis explores Buber's understanding of the 
personal qualities needed by the therapist to allow for the unfolding of dialogue and 
meeting in the therapeutic situation, together with some of the blocks to dialogue and 
meeting that may occur in the therapist. The thesis ends with an analysis of possible 
critiques of Buber, together with some ideas on the relevance of his work for both 
psychotherapy and wider social issues in the South African context. 
For Buber, a theory meant nothing if it could not be applied to everyday life and the 
"lived concrete" which was so precious to him. Therefore, wherever possible, the author 
has attempted to illustrate the points made in this thesis with both clinical material and 
lived experience. While Buber's theories do not lend themselves towards a systematic 
analysis of a single case, small vignettes of moments and "happenings" in therapy and in 
personal life are used, some of these come from clinical material and descriptions of life 
experience provided by other writers, while some are taken from the author's clinical 












1) Most of Buber' s writing took place in the early and middle 1900's, before the 
increased sensitivity to issues of gender equality. He thus employs the male 
pronoun "he" and the male generic tenn "man" in his writing. When quoting 
directly from Buber, for purposes of accuracy I have employed these tenns. 
However, all other writing in the text of the thesis employs the gender sensitive 
slhe and hislher. 
2) The tenn psychotherapy can apply to a wide range of different therapeutic 
methods. When employed here it refers primarily to psychodynamic based 
psychotherapy, which is the primary training of the author. 
3) I have used the tenn "patient" rather than "client" out of a personal preference. I 
feel it captures more accurately the therapeutic exercise, which is one of healing. 
This tenn is in no way meant to be derogatory or belittling, as it is my belief that 












MARTIN BUBER'S PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE 
2.1 EARLY BEGINNINGS AND THE BREAKTHROUGH TO DIALOGUE 
Before one can begin to examine Buber's understanding of the dialogue between persons, 
one needs to have an understanding of his philosophy of dialogue as a whole, of which 
the dialogue between persons is just a part. For Buber, dialogue represented a way of 
relating to the world, indeed a way of life, and his discovery of the way of dialogue was, 
as we shall see, deeply influenced by his own life experiences. In his early writings, 
Buber was primarily concerned with Zionism, a Nietzchean type philosophy of 
realisation and a religious mysticism that saw the dissolving of the individual personality 
within the godhead as the ultimate experience. His development towards his dialogical 
philosophy took place in the period just before and during the First World War (Friedman 
1988, 1991). 
Firstly, Buber began to discover Hasidism, a popular Jewish mystical movement that 
began in Eastern Europe in the 18th century. The Hasidic conception that humans were 
partners with God in the task of making the world a dwelling place for the Divine, and 
that one could discover the Divine in the world through a particular type of relationship 
to it, made a massive impact on Buber. Redemption came not through union but through 
the establishment of contact or meeting, which overcame the "abyss" that separated one 
thing from another and helped to lift the Divine Sparks (Friedman, 1976, 1988). Life was 
perceived as a calling, and the person was called by the Divine towards a particular path 
through the events that happened to him/her. For Buber this was "the dialogical 
relationship ... exemplified in its highest peak" (as cited by Friedman, 1991, p. 46). Thus 
through Hasidism, which understood life as essentially a dialogue between human beings 
and God in which the redemption of the world depended upon a particular type of 











Buber's breakthrough to dialobrue took place during the First World War, and was based 
on a number of experiences, the most significant of which he refers to in his 
Autobiographical Fragments (l967a, p. 25) as a "conversion" that convinced him of the 
importance of the idea of dialogue. One afternoon, after an experience of mystical 
ecstasy, Buber had a visit from a young man named Mehe. However, due to his 
absorption in his previous ecstasy, Buber was not present in spirit. Buber writes that 
while he "certainly did not fail to let the meeting be friendly" and "conversed attentively 
and openly" with Mehe, he was not present and thus "omitted to guess the questions 
which he did not pur' (1967a, p. 25-26). Later, Buber learned from one of Mehe's friends 
the content of those questions, and that Mehe, who was no longer alive "had come to me 
not casually, but borne by destiny, not for a chat but for a decision" (1967a, p. 26). The 
decision was one of life and death for a young man who had begun to lose hope and 
meaning in the world and had come to Buber to try find it. This had not happened and 
Mehe had died in the First World War "out of that kind of despair that may be partially 
defined as no longer opposing one's death" (1967a, p. 26). 
As Friedman (1988) writes, Buber experienced this event as a judgement and he 
responded to it in a way that changed his life. However, Buber's feelings of guilt were 
not based on narcissistic illusions of omnipotence, as if he had the power of life and 
death, but rather out of a feeling that he had not truly listened and heard the other. Buber 
felt he had failed this young man by withholding himself and not responding as a whole 
person to the claim of the situation. As a result the potential dialogue that could have 
saved Mehe had not come alive. It was through this difficult and painful experience that 
Buber grasped the importance of immediacy, presence, truly seeing the other, and 
responding to the claim of the moment, which were to form the basis of his ideas of 
dialogue. More powerful and more holy than all writing was the presence of a human 
being who was simply and immediately there (Friedman, 1988). This led Buber to 
renounce the otherworldly mysticism that had previously laid claim to him, and to begin 
to envision the importance of living life as a dialogue: 
"Since then I have given up the religious ... I know no fullness but each mortal 











I know that in the claim I am claimed and may respond in responsibility ... If that 
is religion then it is just everything, simply all that is lived in the possibility of 
dialogue" (1967a, p. 26). 
In this statement lies the beginnings of Buber's conception of life as a dialogue, and the 
notion that what happens to a person is but a summons to him or her. For Buber, in our 
life and experience we are addressed and the aim of the dialogical life is to be able to 
respond, but to what? Buber answers, "To what happens to one, to what is to be seen and 
heard and felt... each concrete hour is speech to the person who is attentive" (1963a, p. 
34). Thus every moment of life can be a dialogue, but one needs to be truly present to 
hear the address of the moment, while also having the courage to respond to what one 
hears. In his interaction with Mehe that fateful day Buber had failed in this. He had failed 
to be open to and hear the claim of the moment. He had failed the dialogue. It was this 
experience, together with the horrors of the First World War, which Buber believed was 
the result of the failure of dialogue, that led Buber closer to his philosophy of dialogue 
and to the belief that dialogue was "the central question for mankind" (Buber, 1957, p. 
222). 
2.2 I AND THOU: THE FOUNDATION OF BUBER'S PHILOSOPHY OF 
DIALOGUE 
In I and Thou (1923) Buber's philosophy of dialogue finds its first systematic 
expression. Buber (1970, p. 1.) begins with the declaration "To man the world is twofold, 
in accordance with his twofold attitude". The term attitude here means a primary way of 
relating to the world, "a way of setting the selftowards the world and any of the beings 
one meets within it" (Diamond, 1960, p. 22). The two primary modes of relating are 
referred to as "I-Thou" and "I-It". Both attitudes can be directed at all beings in the world 
and they are modes ofrelating that appear alternately in every human being. Most 
importantly, by placing the words I-It and I-Thou together as word pairs, Buber implies 
that the basic and primary reality of human life is relation, and that the I and the world 
with which it comes into contact do not exist in isolation, but rather in relation. Thus, to 











relation to the world, and there is no such thing as a world apart from its relation to the 
individual. Furthermore, both the I and the thing or being which it comes into contact 
with are determined by the type of relation that is taken. Therefore the relation is primary 
and for Buber the sphere in which relation takes place, which he referred to as "the 
between" is that which is onto logically real (Friedman, 1988). 
As the person's I is determined by the mode of relating, the I ofl-It is different from the I 
ofl-Thou. In the I-It mode of relationship, the I holds back from real engagement and is a 
detached observer; categorising, measuring, using and manipulating the object of its 
attention. It is the typical subject-object relationship, and is always mediated by 
categories, assumptions, and theories (Friedman, 1976). I-It relations are impersonal and 
the thing or being with which the I is in relationship is reduced to an "It", that is to the 
level of object and category, and can never, as in the I-Thou relationship, be known in its 
uniqueness or particularity (Diamond, 1960, p. 22). Furthermore while the individual 
may add to his/her knowledge and information, the personal core is in no way touched or 
changed by the relation. It is the mode of analysing and using and takes place within the 
person rather than between the person and the world (Friedman, 1976). It is thus the 
movement of "monologue" and its primary attraction is that it provides the individual 
with a sense of orientation and security, as everything in the world is reduced to the 
known, to the categories of one's own thought. 
In contrast, the I of the I-Thou relationship does not hold a part of itself back, but rather 
enters with the whole being into full engagement with the other. It is direct and personal 
relation and is not mediated by any preconceived ideas or theories. I-Thou is the mode of 
meeting and engagement, and thus takes place between the self and the other rather than 
purely within the self. It is the movement of dialogue and is intersubjective relation rather 
than subject-object relation. It is only in this form of relation that the unique and personal 
of the other, the "Thou", is met. Yet in order for this to happen one needs openness, 
presence, immediacy, and a willingness to respond with one's whole being that has been 
outlined above (Friedman, 1976). One also has to be able to bear what Buber refers to as 











without imposing oneself on it. This type of relationship cannot be forced or planned; one 
can only patiently open one's self to being addressed. 
When an I-Thou relation occurs and meeting takes place, there is mutuality in the relation 
and the knowing self is affected in an essential way. Buber writes, "Relation is 
reciprocity. My Thou acts on me as I act on it. Our students teach us, our works form 
us ... Inscrutably involved, we live in the currents of universal reciprocity" (1970, p. 67). 
Indeed Buber argues that it is through the I-Thou relation that the self is formed and we 
find our own unique direction, "I require a Thou to become; becoming I, I say Thou" 
(1970, p. 54). 
One of the common misunderstandings of Buber's philosophy is that the I-It relationship 
is the source of evil and that one should strive to always be in an I-Thou mode of relating 
(Friedman, 1996). However Buber was not arguing for such a simple dualism, rather he 
was arguing for a holding of the tension between the I-Thou and I-It modes of rei ali on so 
that neither becomes dominant (Friedman, 1996). Buber (1970) argues that one cannot 
live constantly in a state of I-Thou relation as one would not be able to endure its 
intensity and lack of order, and every Thou must eventually become an It. Further, Buber 
argues that the I-It mode of relation is both important and necessary as it helps humanity 
orientate and sustain itself in life through the ordered and surveyable world it creates; 
"without It man cannot live" (1970, p. 34). Thus life in its natural form involves a 
changing rhythm of I-Thou and I-It relations, and the I-It mode of relation only becomes 
evil when it becomes so powerful that individuals can no longer meet the beings that they 
come into contact with in a spontaneous or genuine way. They can no longer "go out to 
the Other". This is an important point to keep in mind in order to understand Buber's 
philosophy as one that does not fall into an either/or dualism, but rather argues for a more 
balanced and integrated understanding of human relatingI . 
I This ability to not choose between dualisms but rather hold their tension is the hallmark of Buber's 
philosophy, and was labeled by him as thc "narrow ridge", as it moves between the peaks of absolute 











2.3 I-IT AND I-THOU MODES OF RELATING IN HUMAN 
RELATIONSHIPS 
In terms of human relationships, which this thesis is primarily concerned with, I-It 
moments of relation occur when an individual relates to fellow persons as objects. This 
occurs when the other is objectified or categorized, or when the other is seen as an object 
of use and manipulation. In these moments others are never seen in their own right, but 
are related to from the point of view of one's own knowledge or the function they serve 
for the self. A good example of this mode of relating to others as an object rather than 
person was a 38-year-old patient seen by the author at an inpatient therapy ward. The 
patient, a very needy and dependant individual, could only relate to others as extensions 
of self At home he refused to buy an alarm clock, preferring that his mother wake him in 
the morning and motivate him to get out of bed, a ritual that took much coaxing and 
effort. In essence he placed her in a regulatory function, she was to motivate him every 
day and give him a reason to get up, while also serving as an alarm clock for him. He 
failed to see how this could be difficult for her. A similar manner of relating emerged in 
the therapy relationship where he related to the therapist purely as a source of motivation, 
and could not understand why the therapist did not have time to constantly be available 
for this whenever he needed it. In effect his mother was, for him, an alarm clock, and his 
therapist, a motivational coach and provider of initiative; he did not see them as other 
people, separate from himself and not eapable of constantly providing what he needed. 
On the other hand an I-Thou moment of relationship would involve a moment of relation 
to the genuine otherness of the other person. It would mean that I in my totality am 
relating to another in his or her totality. Consciously one has the attitude ofletting the 
other person live in his/her own right and not making an object ofhirnlher for one's own 
purposes. Further, the relationship involves reciprocity, mutuality and changes both 











apart from the relationship. A good example of this type of moment of relating is 
provided by Bertrand Russell's description of his meeting with Joseph Conrad2: 
"At our very first meeting, we talked with continually increasing intimacy. We 
seemed to sink through layer after layer of what was superficial, till gradually 
both reached the central fire. It was an experience unlike any other I have ever 
known. We looked into each other's eyes, half appalled and half intoxicated to 
find ourselves in such a region. The emotion was intense ... and at the same time 
all-embracing ... " (as cited in Yalom, 1980, p. 396) 
Though Russell spent a few hours with Conrad, he reports that he was forever 
transformed by it, that something of the moment of their meeting remained always with 
him and played a fundamental role in the shaping of his future attitudes and relationships 
with others. Thus the I-Thou relationship is one of intense emotion and encounter, a 
meeting of whole being to whole being in the immediacy of the moment, so that both are 
changed forever. Yet what is needed for an I-Thou relationship to take place between two 
persons, and what are the elements of such a relationship? 
2.4 PRESUPPOSITIONS FOR DIALOGUE AND THE I-THOU 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONS 
Buber's thoughts on dialogue and I-Thou relationship between persons are scattered 
throughout his works. This section will primarily focus on his most systematic and 
comprehensive account of this relationship, an essay titled "Elements of the Interhuman" 
(l965a). In this essay Buber identifies four presuppositions of dialogue: seeing the Thou 
of the other, confirming the other in his/her uniqueness, bringing oneself to the dialogue 
without reserve, and letting the other be without imposition. 
2 Of course for this to be an I-Thou moment of relating Conrad must have experienced a similar feeling. 












2.4.1 Seeing the Thou: Imagining the Real, Experiencing the Other Side and 
Inclusion 
"The loving man's dream powerful and primally-awake heart beholds the non-common. 
This, the unique, is ... the self of the thing that cannot be detained within the circle of 
comprehensibility" (Buber, 1966, p. 97). 
For Buber, each thing and being in the world has a twofold nature: the abstracted general 
qualities which can be known by the person who has the ability "to draw out qualities 
common to all things and distribute them in ready made categories" - the "It", and the 
concrete irreducibly unique qualities which are particular only to that thing or being - the 
"Thou" (1966, p. 97). In tenns of human beings, the person's Thou manifests in that 
which is unique and genuinely other in hirnlher. In order for an I-Thou relationship to 
take place between two persons, the first presupposition is that one must become aware 
of the Thou of the other. Buber (1965a) argues that this awareness can only take place if 
one turns to the other in the spirit ofpartnership, rather than manipulation or using. To 
establish a living mutual dialogue the other needs to be accepted the way slhe is without 
wanting to change him/her. Therefore the chief presupposition of dialogue is that there is 
a genuine turning to the other, an outgoing to the otherness of the partner where the other 
does not merely exist as a part of one's experience, and one is able to become "aware that 
he is different, essentially different from myself, in the definite unique way which is 
peculiar to him" (1965a, p. 79). Buber goes on to explain what he means by the word 
"aware": 
"To be aware of a thing or being means, in quite general tenns, to experience it as 
a whole, and yet at the same time without abstraction or reduction, in all its 
concreteness ... To be aware of a man, therefore, means in particular to perceive 
his wholeness as a person ... to perceive the dynamic center which stamps his 
every utterance, action and attitude with the recognisable sign of uniqueness" 











Such an awareness of the Thou of the other is not possible if the other becomes "a 
separated object of my contemplation or observation", but can only be achieved when 
one steps into an "elemental relation" with the other, so that the other "becomes present 
to me" (1965a, p. 80). Yet how does the other become present? Buber explains that this 
becomes possible through the use of an ability that is inherent in every human being, the 
ability to "imagine the real" of the other. Buber describes this as a " bold swinging 
demanding the most intensive stirring of one's being into the life of the other" through 
the use of the imagination, but here the imagining is limited to "the particular real person 
who confronts me" (1965a, p. 81). Thus this action involves imagining quite concretely 
what another person is wishing, feeling, perceiving and thinking, and not as a detached 
content but in the person's very reality, "as a living process in this man" (1965a, p. 80). 
Through imagining the real one is able to "make the other present as a whole and unique 
being, as the person that he is" (1965a, p. 81). Through this "making present" one is able 
to "experience the other side ", that is experience something as the other is experiencing 
it. Buber provides a vivid example of this: 
"Experiencing the other side a man belabours another, who remains quite stilL 
Then let us assume that the striker suddenly receives in his own soul the blow 
which he strikes: the same blow; that he receives it as the other who remains still. 
For the space of the moment he experiences the situation from the other side. 
Reality imposes itself on him. What will he do? Either he will overwhelm the 
voice of the soul or his impulses will be reversed" (1 963a, p. 123). 
Buber's notions of imagining the real and experiencing the other side sound remarkably 
similar to the psychological concept of empathy, yet Buber is at pains to point out that he 
is not talking about empathy, which he identifies as a transposing of oneself into the 
dynamic structure of the object, thus leading to "the exclusion of one's own concreteness, 
the extinguishing of the actual situation of life", but rather an inclusion, where one is able 
to have direct contact with the experience of another "without forfeiting anything of the 
felt reality of his own activity", that is without losing one's own experiencing self (1963a, 
p. 124). This distinction is crucial to Buber, as his understanding of dialogue rests upon 












"The basis of man's life with man is twofold, and it is one -- the wish of every man to be 
confirmed as what he is, even as what he can become, by men; and the innate capacity in 
man to confirm his fellow-men in this way. That this capacity lies so immeasurably fallow 
constitutes the real weakness and questionableness of the human race: actual humanity 
exists only where this capacity unfolds" (Buber, 1965b, p. 68). 
The true gift of imagining the real is that when the other becomes present there is an 
ability to confirm the other in his/her personal uniqueness, which occurs when the other 
knows that slhe has been made present and this knowledge induces the act of "inmost 
self-becoming" (1965b, p. 71). For Buber, this act of confirmation is both wished for and 
needed by every human being to fulfill the uniqueness one is called to become, as "the 
inmost growth of the selfis not accomplished, as people like to suppose today, in man's 
relation to himself, but ... between men ... in the mutuality of acceptance, of affirmation, 
and confirmation" (1965b, p. 71). Buber writes: 
"The human person needs confirmation because man as man needs it. An animal 
does not need to be confirmed, for it is what it is unquestionably. It is different 
with man ... secretly and bashfully he watches for a Yes which allows him to be 
and which can come to him only from one person to another. It is from one man 
to another that the heavenly bread of self-being is passed" (1965b, p. 71). 
Thus Buber makes clear in this passage his belief that the growth of the self, of that 
which is unique and particular in a person, needs the presence of another who can 
confirm the person in his/her essence. For Buber, confirmation can only come about 
when one accepts the other as slhe is, yet it does not imply that one has to agree with the 
other, and confirmation can also take place when one opposes the person. Even a 
meeting in opposition can confirm the other as the one s/he is, as it takes the other's point 
of view and existence seriously enough to genuinely engage with it. Further, Buber's 











as they are, but in its highest fonn, it also involves confinning in the other what slhe is 
meant to become. Buber writes: 
"Confinning means first of all, accepting the whole potentiality of the other and 
making even a decisive difference in this potentiality ... I can recognise in him, 
know in him, more or less, the person he has been (l can say this only in this 
word) created to become ... And now I not only accept the other as he is, but I 
confinn in him, in myself, and then in him, in relation to this potentiality that is 
meant by him and it can now be developed, it can evolve ... " (1965c, p. 182). 
2.4.3 Being versus Seeming 
"Where the dialogue is fulfilled in its being, between partners who have turned to one 
another in truth, who express themselves without reserve and are free of the desire for 
semblance, there is brought into being a memorable common fruitfulness which is to 
found nowhere else" (Buber, 1965a, p. 86). 
Thus the act of imagining the real and perceiving the other as this particular unique being 
is essential for the establishment of dialogue and an I-Thou relationship between persons. 
However, for the establishment of an I-Thou relationship one does not only need to see 
and mean the other, one also needs to bring oneself to the relationship, and this leads to 
an area which Buber regarded as the essential problem for human relationships, that is 
"the duality of being and seeming" (l965a, p. 75). Buber writes that it is "a familiar fact 
that men are often troubled about the impression they make on others", and this fact leads 
to two types of human existence: being, which proceeds from "what one really is", and 
seeming, which proceeds from "what one wishes to seem" to the other (1965a, p. 75-78). 
For Buber, these two tendencies are found together in each human being and are often in 
conflict, but it is important to "distinguish between men in whose essential attitude the 
one or the other predominates" (1965a, p. 76). 
The person for whom "being" predominates is both spontaneous and unreserved. While 
not uninfluenced by the need to be understood by the other, the person is not detennined 











On the other hand, the person for whom "seeming" predominates is primarily concerned 
with the image the other has of him/her, and thus will try to produce an image the other 
desires or is thought to be impressed by. The seeming mode creates mistrust between 
persons, as it leads to a conflict between what one means and what one says, and between 
what one says and what one does (Buber, 1963b). This conflict and mistrust threatens the 
development of dialogue between persons, as one withholds oneself or does not truly 
speak because of the concern about how this would appear to the other. 
For Buber, the only way for genuine dialogue to take place was if truth reigned in the 
interpersonal sphere and for this to happen "it means that men have to communicate 
themselves to one another as they are" (1965a, p. 77). Therefore one needs to say what 
one really thinks without abbreviation or distortion, as this thought proceeds from one's 
being. Everything depends on the authenticity with which one speaks, and whether one 
proceeds from what one really is, rather than from what one wishes to look like to the 
other. Yet it is important to note that Buber is not arguing for Freudian free association, 
where one speaks everything that comes into one's mind and lets oneself go before 
another, but rather that one does not let "seeming creep in between himself and another" 
and communicates "a part of his being" (1965a, p. 86). To communicate part of one's 
being may involve both thought and deliberation, not merely self-expression3• 
3 Buber (1965a) goes on to ask a key question. Why do human beings care so much about how we seem to 
others? For Buber this tendency towards living in the "seeming mode" did not stem from human nature, but 
rather from the human need and desire for confirmation. In the individual's search and need for this 
confirmation, the tendency towards seeming originates, as it "deceptively offers itself as a help in this". It is 











2.4.4 Imposition versus Unfolding 
"To intel/ere with the life of things means to harm both them and oneself .. He who 
imposes himself has the small, manifest might; he who does not impose himself has the 
great, secret might... " (Bubel', as cited by Rogers, 1980, p. 41-42). 
Therefore the invasion of seeming and the inability to perceive the Thou of the other are 
two things that impede the growth of dialogue and a true I-Thou relation between 
persons. Yet there is a third danger to the I-Thou relationship, which Buber regarded as 
"more powerful and more dangerous than ever" (1965a, p. 82), and is of particular 
relevance to psychotherapy as it involves the question of how one person influences 
another. Buber describes two different ways by which one person can affect another's 
worldview and life, "imposition" and "unfolding" (1965a, p. 82-85). Imposition occurs 
when the person tries to influence and affect another by "imposing himself, his opinion, 
his attitude, on the other" so that eventually the other becomes like one, yet is "unaware 
of how he has been influenced" (1965a, p. 82). On the other hand, unfolding occurs when 
one discovers and nourishes in the soul of the other what one has discovered in oneself as 
right. As one has faith in its truth, it must also exist in the other as a potentiality that 
merely needs to be unlocked, not through conscious imposition and instruction, but rather 
through meeting and existential communication "between someone that is in actual being 
and someone that is in the process of becoming" (1965a, p. 82). 
The person who uses imposition Buber terms "the propagandist", and he argues that this 
type of person "is not in the least concerned with the person whom he desires to influence 
as a person", but rather is only interested in the personal qualities of the individual "in so 
far as he can exploit them to win the other" (1965a, p. 82). The person who helps others 
unfold their potentialities Buber terms the "educator", and he argues that this person 
"lives in a world of individuals" and is able to see the unique and personal of the other, 
and attempts to help this unfold into being. Buber writes of the educator: 
"He sees each of these individuals as in a position to become a unique, single 











through him and him alone. He sees every personal life as engaged in such a 
process of actualisation, and he knows from his own experience that the forces 
making for actualisation are all the time involved in a struggle with counterforces. 
He has come to see himself as the helper of the actualising forces ... He cannot 
wish to impose himself, for he believes in the effect of the actualising forces, that 
is he believes that in every man what is right is established in a single and 
uniquely personal way" (1965a, p. 83). 
2.5 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER TWO 
Therefore, Buber's philosophy of dialogue grew out of personal experiences and failures 
of his own. These led to Buber's understanding of the capacity for dialogue, that is to be 
immediately present for another in the moment and to be able to meet the other and 
respond with one's whole being, as the central question for human beings at the time of 
the First World War. The life of dialogue was characterised by a particular relationship to 
other beings - the I-Thou relationship. This is contrasted with the I-It relationship, which 
is, in Buber's terms, a monological relationship between subject and object that is 
mediated by categories and assumptions, and does not have the same impact on the 
parties as the dialogical meeting involved in the I-Thou relationship. For dialogue to 
develop Buber argues that one needs to see the unique in the other, be authentic in one's 
response, and allow the other to unfold rather than impose one's own perspective on the 
other. Yet how did Buber view the implications of his philosophy of dialogue for the 
practice of psychotherapy, and how did he view the psychotherapeutic exercise in 












BUBER ON PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPy4 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
For most of his life, Buber had an active interest in psychiatry and psychotherapy, which 
began at the age of 20 when he took a 3-term course at various psychiatric clinics in 
Germany and Switzerland. However, while Buber began these studies because of a desire 
to become a psychotherapist, he found the psychiatric clinics of the time, where the 
patients were displayed before an audience, disturbing and thus chose a different 
vocational path (Friedman, 1991 ). Yet, despite this, over the years he maintained a 
dialogue and interest in this field, acquiring a number of deep insights into 
psychotherapy, some of which will be explored in this section. More specifically, the 
section will focus on four essential insights that Buber provides: his criticism of 
"psychologism" and the concept of a self-contained, isolated psyche; his notion of the 
"between" and his argument that both sickness and healing occur in this "between"; his 
understanding of healing as taking place through "meeting"; and his concept of 
confirmation in therapy and his distinguishing between this concept and Rogers' (1980) 
idea of "unconditional positive regard". 
3.2 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND THE "BETWEEN" 
Buber's primary critique of modern psychology and psychotherapy was its tendency 
towards what he referred to as "psychologism" and the "psychologising of the world" 
5The following discussion ofBuber's ideas about psychotherapy come from four primary sources: the talks 
he gave at the Washington School of Psychiatry in 1957 for the Fourth Annual William Alanson White 
Memorial Lectures, where he specifically focused on issues to do with the world of psychology, psychiatry 
and psychotherapy; the dialogue he had with Carl Rogers at the University of Michigan during the same 
year; an essay he wrote as a Foreword for the book written by his friend and in many ways disciple, the 
former Jungian, Hans Trub, entitled "Healing Through Meeting", and an informal lecture he gave in 1923 
"On the Psychologising ofthe World" for the Psychological Club of Zurich, the most eminent centre of 
Jungian therapy at the time [all of these can be found in a recent collection of his writings on this topic 











(1967b, p. 144). By the psychologising of the world Buber meant "the inclusion of the 
world in the soul" which goes so far that "the essential is thereby disturbed", and the 
basic relation from which life receives its meaning - "the facing of the I and the world" is 
injured (1967b, p. 144-145). Through the psychologising of the world, the world is 
moved into the sphere of one's feelings, one's thoughts, or one's analyses, so that the 
events that take place between the person and the world are reduced to intrapsychic 
happenings. As a result the essence of dialogue, the turning to the other, is damaged, as 
the other now exists only as a part of one's experience and one's self, and not in his/her 
own independent particularity. 
Buber argued that this psychologism had led to a false understanding of the psyche as 
self-encapsulated, "something lifted out of the relationship to the world, isolated and 
abstracted", rather than psyche of which the person is immediately aware, which is a 
psyche always in relationship, whether it be to the world, things, or human beings 
(1967b, p. 147). This has led to a psychology "only concerned with the relation of the 
human person to himself, with the relation within this person between spirit and instincts" 
(Buber, 1963a, p. 240, italics mine). Buber (1963a, p. 244-245) argued against this 
individualism which he felt ignored the primary category of human reality, that of the 
"between". The psychological, Buber argued, was only a "hidden accompaniment of the 
dialogue", of the happenings of the "between", and if one regards psychic phenomena 
more deeply, one finds that they have arisen out of the relationship between the self and 
the other and are comprehensible only through this relationship. Thus for Buber the 
"between", rather than the psychological and the intrapsychic, is the "fundamental fact of 
existence" and "the real place and bearer of what happens between men" (1963a, p. 245). 
This understanding leads Buber to provide a different understanding of both sickness and 
healing, an understanding rooted in the "between"s. 
5 The "between" can be defined as the third reality which emerges when two people meet. There is the 











3.3 SICKNESS AND THE "BETWEEN" 
"A soul is never sick alone, but there is always a between-ness also, a situation between 
it and another human being" (Buber, 1967c, p. 142) 
For Buber, just as the psychological was the hidden accompaniment of dialogue, so to 
was "mental illness" a result of the sickness of the "between". While Buber did not go 
into this in great detail, he illustrates this point by providing an alternative view of the 
cause of repression, which is rooted in the "between". For Freud (1972) repression was 
understood as an internal and mechanistic psychic phenomenon that was used by the ego 
to prevent the psyche from being overrun by the demands ofthe id, which it achieved by 
keeping out of awareness instincts and thoughts that were threatening. It is not difficult to 
see how this view of the cause ofrepression stems from the assumption of an isolated and 
self-encapsulated psyche. Buber reinterprets repression and argues that, while repression 
as a concept has validity, it only becomes dominant when there is a sickness in relations 
between persons: 
"When confidence reigns man must often, indeed, adapt his wishes to the 
commands of his community; but he must not repress them to such an extent that 
the repression requires a dominant significance for his life ... Only if the organic 
community disintegrates from within and mistrust becomes life's basic note does 
the repression acquire its dominating importance. The unaffectedness of wishing 
is stifled by mistrust, everything around is hostile or can become hostile, 
agreement between one's own and the other's desire ceases ... and the dulled 
wishes creep hopelessly into the recesses of the souL .. The divorce between spirit 
and instincts is here, as often, the consequence of the divorce between man and 
man." (1963a, p. 237-238, italics mine) 
Thus while repression is found even in small organic communities living in real 
togetherness, the individual does not have to repress hislher wishes to the extent that they 
acquire a "dominating significance". However, if mistrust between persons is dominant 











soul", where they now exert a powerful influence. Buber reinterprets repression as 
emerging from the sickness of the "between", the sickness in the relationship between 
human beings. 
Thus Buber provides an understanding of psychological sickness as rooted in, and 
stemming from, the "between". Yet Buber, in his dialogue with Carl Rogers, goes further 
and argues that psychological sickness, in tum, also manifests in terms of an inability to 
enter into dialogue with others. This Buber makes clear in his discussion about seriously 
mentally ill persons, whom he sees as severely damaged in their capacity for dialogue, in 
their capacity for "betweeness"; 
"I can talk to a schizophrenic, as far as he is willing to let me in to his particular 
world that is his own ... But the moment he shuts himself in, I cannot go on. And 
the same, only in a terrible, terrifyingly powerful way, is the case with the 
paranoiac ... He does not open himself and he does not shut himself. He is shut ... 
And I feel this terrible fate very strongly because in the world of normal men 
there are analogous cases, when a sane man behaves, not to everyone, but to some 
people, just so, as if he had been shut in and the problem is if he can be opened, if 
he can open himself. .. this is a problem for human beings in general". (Buber, 
1965c, p. 175) 
3.4 HEALING THROUGH MEETING 
"If the doctor possesses superhuman power he will try to heal the relationship itself, to 
heal in the 'between '" (Buber, 1967b, p. 150). 
Therefore, Buber reinterprets psychological phenomena, including pathological 
phenomena, as being a product of the "between". This leads Buber to present a different 
model of healing, for if sicknesses are the result of the "between", it follows that true 












"The sicknesses of the soul are sicknesses of relationship. They can only be 
treated completely if I transcend the realm of patient and add to it the world as 
well. If the doctor possesses superhuman power he will try to heal the relationship 
itself, to heal in the 'between'" (1967b, p. 150). 
Thus in psychotherapy Buber was aware of the need to go beyond psychologism, which 
refers all events and meaning back to the psyche, and to reach the ground of healing 
through meeting, a healing in and of the "between". When the soul is regarded in 
isolation, this sickness of the "between" is forgotten. What is crucial in therapy is the 
therapist's ability to heal in this "between". 
In his essay Healing Through Meeting, Buber (1967c) argues that this way of healing can 
be achieved by the psychotherapist. In this essay he talks of the paradox of the 
psychotherapy. The therapist analyses the psychic material the patient brings according to 
the theory of his/her school, and in so doing creates a tranquilizing and to some extent 
orienting and integrating procedure that is pleasing to the patient. While this method of 
therapy can provide symptomatic relief and "help a soul which is diffused and poor in 
structure to colleet and order itself to some extent", it does not provide healing of the 
"atrophied personal center" (1970, p. 132). However in some cases the therapist realises 
that something entirely different is demanded of himiher, something different from this 
role and threatening to its regulated procedures. What is demanded is that the therapist 
step out of the role of protected professional superiority into the elementary situation 
between two human beings. The human being in the patient calls to the real, unprotected 
self of the therapist and not to his or her confidently functioning security of action 
provided by methodology, technique and theory. If the therapist answers this call, 
meeting and dialogue take place, a meeting that can lead to the healing of the "atrophied 
personal center" of the patient. While the therapist may return to his/her objective method 
after this, it is as a changed person returning to a changed method, namely as one who 
has realised the necessity of an authentic human relationship between therapist and 
patient. In this new method the unexpected, that which demands personal participation, 
finds place and the therapist's task is nothing less than the courage to risk his or her very 











"he has left in a decisive hour ... the closed room of psychological treatment in 
which the analyst rules by means of his systematic and methodological superiority 
and has gone forth with his patient into the air of the world where selfhood is 
opposed to selfhood. There in the closed room, where one probed and treated the 
isolated psyche according to the inclination of the self-encapsulated patient, the 
patient was referred to ever deeper levels of his inwardness as to his proper world; 
here outside, in the immediacy of human standing over against one another, the 
encapsulation must and can be broken through, and a transformed, healed 
relationship must and can be opened to the sick person in his relation to otherness 
- to the world of the other which he cannot remove into his soul" (Buber, 1967 c, 
p. 142). 
3.4.1 Vignette One 
This moment of stepping beyond role and into that of person so that meeting can occur is 
illustrated by Goldberg (2000) in his account of a moment of healing through meeting 
that occurred with a patient whom he had been having extreme difliculty in interviewing 
at a case conference due to her refusal to answer questions in anything other than one 
word answers. As Goldberg's anxiety, embarrassment and irritation rose, he discovered 
this insight ofBuber's: 
"I recognized that to have communion with another person's suffering, I could no 
longer present myself as a professionally aloof being, but as a fellow sojourner. .. 
Accordingly, I needed to reveal my feelings candidly about my difficult impasse 
with Mrs Franz ... I indicated to Mrs Franz that I had been asked to interview her 
because supposedly I had some expertise in a case like hers. I added that I had no 
idea where this absurd notion came from. I smiled and pointed to the audience, 
while saying to her that she must be aware, as were the others in the room, how 
poorly I was doing. For a moment Mrs Franz appeared not to know what to make 
of my statement. Then for the first time in the interview, a slow smile crept over 
her face. Her smile evolved for a while into a quiet laugh. The softening of her 











increasingly of my shameful feelings, she became more responsive to me. She 
told me, "Dr Goldberg, I am now willing to talk with you ... my lack of 
cooperation, if you want to call it that, is simply because I don't want to be the 
only person in the room who is going to admit to having feelings. To speak of my 
troubles in a room of professionals, who are all acting inaccessibly, makes me 
feeL .. terribly alone" (p. 570-571). 
Here is the moment of human immediacy, of personal relationship between self and self, 
which breaks out of the traditional role of therapist-patient and through the self-
encapsulated loneliness of the patient. A moment of meeting that restores the capacity of 
both the therapist and the patient for dialogue. 
3.5 THE THERAPIST'S CAPACITY FOR OPENNESS 
Thus Buber argues that for the therapist to heal in the "between" meeting needs to take 
place. Buber later argued that it was not only the patient, but also the therapist who 
created barriers to meeting. For meeting to take place it is not sufficient that the therapist 
is a "master of method", but s/he also needs a certain quality Buber refers to as 
"existential trust" (l967d, p. 170). This is the willingness of the therapist to stay open to 
the unfolding dialogue and bear the insecurity this involves. Yet for this to happen the 
therapist needs to have the capacity to move beyond a clinging to the theories of his/her 
school: 
"There are 2 kinds of therapists, one who knows more or less consciously the kind 
of interpretation he will get and the other, the psychologist who does not know. I 
am entirely on the side of the latter, who does not want something precise. He is 
ready to receive what he will receive. He cannot know what method he will use 
beforehand. He is, so to speak, in the hands of his patient ... he must be ready to 
be surprised. From this new type of therapist may evolve - a person of greater 
responsibility and even greater gifts, since it is not so easy to master new attitudes 











Thus the therapist needs the capacity to remain open to the uniqueness of the patient, the 
capacity to be surprised. For Buber, this capacity was lacking in Freud, whom he saw as 
one of the great simplifiers, that is "one who places a general concept in place of the ever 
renewed investigation of reality" (1967 d, p. 157). While Buber felt that much 
psychotherapeutic thought has been based on this dangerous manner of thinking he hoped 
in the early 1960's that this period was coming to an end. In place of the analytical, 
reductive perspective of Freud, that tries to "contract the manifold person ... to some 
schematically surveyable and recurrent structures", thus assuming it can "grasp what a 
man has become, or even is becoming, in genetic formula" which can be "represented by 
a general concept" (Buber, 1965a, p. 80-81), Buber looked forward to a new, more 
musical type oftherapist. This therapist would not simply follow the theories of his or her 
school, but would practise "obedient listening" and discover the right method and right 
response for each particular person, just as one would not interpret a poem by Keats in 
the same manner one would interpret a poem by Yeats. However, it is important to note 
that Buber was not against the therapist having a theory, and he clearly stated that that 
"without methods one is a dilettante" and that no therapist could do without a typology 
and method (1967d, p.164). However, he argued that the therapist must not impose this 
method on the patient, while also being aware of the moment in therapy when it needs to 
be given up and have the courage to do so. It is this "narrow ridge" that the therapist must 
walk, the ridge of "holy insecurity". 
3.6 CONFIRMATION VERSUS UNCONDITIONAL POSITIVE REGARD 
In 1957, on his second visit to America, Buber had a dialogue with Carl Rogers, who had 
been greatly influenced by Buber's work (see Rogers, 1980). Perhaps the most essential 
difference between Buber and Rogers that emerged was their different perspectives of 
confirmation, which in turn was rooted in their differing perceptions of the human image. 
For Rogers the individual was essentially good and the deepest part of him could be 
trusted, while for Buber the person was not this simple, and "what you say can be trusted 
stands in polar relation to what can least be trusted in man ... When I grasp him more 











dependant on one another ... I may be able to help him just by helping him to change the 
relation between the poles" (1965c, p. 180). 
This perspective of the human being as existing in polarity leads Buber to argue that, 
while all existential relationship begins with accepting the other as slhe is, there cannot 
just be an unconditional positive affirmation of everything s/he says, does and is. True 
confirming means "accepting the whole potentiality of the other and even making a 
decisive difference in this potentiality" (1965b, p. 180). Buber argued that in his 
relationships to others he often had to help others against themselves, in order to find 
their direction: 
'The first thing is that he trust me ... What he wants is a being not only whom he 
can trust as one man trusts another, but a being that give him a certitude that ... the 
world is not condemned to deprivation, degeneration, destruction. The world can 
be redeemed. I can be redeemed because there is trust. And if this can be reached, 
now I can help this man even in his struggle against himself. And I can do this 
only if! distinguish between accepting and confirming" (1965b, p. 180). 
If this is so, confirming the person as he is now is only yet first step for the therapist. S/he 
must also take the person in their dynamic existence, their specific potentiality. In the 
present lies hidden what can become. Thus there are two stages to therapy. The first 
involves accepting the other as s/he is, and learning to understand the other through 
imagining the reaL During this stage a relationship of trust is also developed. However 
there is also a second stage, in which the therapist must put before the patient the claim of 
the world, and enters into the struggle with the patient to bring out the potentialities that 
lie hidden. However, to do this the therapist must enter into a stage where certain traits or 
behaviors of the other must be challenged and confronted, in order that the deepest 
potential ofthe other may emerge. For Buber, this can only happen if the therapist is able 
to distinguish between accepting the other and confirming the other, a distinction he 











3.7 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER THREE 
Thus Buber offers some criticisms of psychotherapy's "psychologism" and argues for a 
greater awareness of the "between" and the dialogicaL In doing so he argues that both 
sickness and healing occur in this "between", and that the task of the therapist is to 
restore the between through the act of meeting, which creates healing. To achieve this the 
therapist needs the existential courage to stay open to the unfolding dialogue, and respond 
to the patient's address with his/her whole being, as one person to another. Further, the 
therapist, in this response, has the great responsibility of helping to confirm the patient in 
both who s/he is and in whom s/he can become. This can only be done if the concept of 
the therapist's role in this confirmation goes beyond unthinking acceptance and approval, 
and also allows for the therapist to struggle with and against the patient in his/her search 
for selfhood. Yet while Buber began the process of drawing out the implications of his 
philosophy of dialogue for the psychotherapist, a full analysis of how his thought can 
contribute to the theory and practice of psychotherapy is still an ongoing process. The 












THE RELEVANCE OF BUBER'S THOUGHT FOR THE THEORY OF 
PSYCHOTHERAPY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
When examining the question of what contribution Buber's philosophy of dialogue and 
thought on psychotherapy can make to the field, one needs to question how Buber's ideas 
can provide a coherent map that can be used to give the psychotherapist some 
understanding of the content and process of psychotherapy, as any useful theory should 
do (Yalom, 1980), while also providing the therapist with some guidelines for practice. In 
doing this the thesis will draw not only on Buber's original ideas, but also on the ideas of 
other therapists and thinkers, who have extended some of his ideas into the realm of 
psychotherapy to form what Friedman (1992a) and others have called the school of 
"dialogical therapy". Further, an attempt will be made to examine points of 
correspondence that Buber's thought has with other schools of therapy, particularly 
recent trends in psychoanalytic theory towards a relational perspective. 
It is argued here that Buber's philosophy of dialogue and thoughts on psychotherapy 
provides an understanding oftherapy which includes: I) An ontology of the "between" of 
relation as that which is essential and primary and needs to be the unit of study and focus 
amongst psychotherapists; and a corresponding image of the human being as essentially 
relational and requiring others to fully develop. 2) An image of the fully human and of 
pathology that is couched in relational terms. 3) A theory of the goal of therapy as the 
restoration of dialogue and the direction and work of therapy as helping the patient move 
from monologue to dialogue. 4) An understanding of the agent of change and healing in 
therapy as "meeting". Finally some of the difficulties that the therapist may encounter in 
dialogical therapy, together with some guidelines for practice, the most essential of which 











4.2 THE "BETWEEN" AS PRIMARY 
In his philosophy of dialogue, Buber argues that the idea of the "individual" as an 
isolated self-contained psyche was an abstraction that drew away from the essential 
reality of life, that of "man with man" (1963a, p. 244-245). For Buber the psychological 
is only the hidden accompaniment of the dialogical, which takes place in the sphere of the 
"between", and psychological phenomena such as repression are the product of it. Thus, 
despite its difficulties to express, it is this sphere of the "between" of relation that is 
primary and onto logically real, and thus it is this sphere that should be the unit of study 
and investigation among psychotherapists. 
This idea of the "between" or the "interpersonal", as it is sometimes referred to in 
psychotherapy, as primary has been confirmed by the critical shift in psychoanalytic 
theory in the past 30 years, which has moved towards a relational perspective and away 
from a one-person psychology with its emphasis on the intrapsychic towards a two-
person psychology with an emphasis on the interpersonal and intersubjective (Greenberg 
and Mitchell, 1983, Mitchell, 1988). This relational perspective has in common with 
Buber a criticism of "the myth of the isolated mind" (Storolow and Atwood, 1992) and an 
understanding of the mind as essentially interactive, dyadic and formed in relation to 
others. Through this "relational tum" the Freudian understanding of the mind as 
essentially monadic, inbuilt, prestructured, and his notion that human relationships were 
only secondary and derived from inbuilt drives has been reversed. It is currently argued 
that it is through relationships and the interpersonal space that the mind is shaped and 
formed, a theory remarkably similar to Buber's concept of the "between" as primary and 
determining the psychological. Further, in line with Buber's call for greater study of this 
sphere, this field has focused on theorising where "the basic unit of study is not the 
individuaL .. but an interactional field within which the individual arises" (Mitchell, 
1988,3). Buber's insights in this area have also been confirmed by infant research into 
the nature of the mind and how it develops through a relational matrix (see Jaffe, 2001 











The understanding of the "between" as primary and the self-encapsulated person as an 
abstraction leads to Buber's understanding of human beings as essentially requiring 
relation and motivated towards relation. In Buber's conception, human beings are not 
self-sufficient entities but rather need others to become fully human and realise their 
potential. More specifically, Buber argued that the essential thing we need from others 
and cannot do without is confirmation of our own uniqueness, which we cannot realise 
without the acceptance and confirmation of others. This "partnership of existence" 
suggests that our velY existence is only properly understood and can only come to 
fruition through partnership (Friedman, 1972, p. 304). As Friedman writes, "we become 
selves with one another and live our lives with one another in the most real sense of the 
term" (1972, p. 304). 
It is fascinating to note how this insight of Buber's has been confirmed by recent 
developments in the field of psychoanalysis that have been informed by developmental 
theory. Indeed, the two theorists most responsible for the study of the building up of the 
self, Winnicott and Kohut, argue that, in order to fully develop, the individual self needs 
a "facilitating environment" or "selfobject" that can only be provided by others. Further, 
their understanding of what the developing self needs is remarkably similar to Buber's 
understanding of confirmation that comes from imagining the real. For Winnicott it was 
the mother's capacity to respond to and take seriously, that is to confirm, the needs of the 
infant, that allowed the infant to have the experience of "going on being" through which 
the self is developed. This is achieved through "maternal preoccupation" which enables 
the mother to imagine the real of what the infant needs (Newman, 1995). For Kohut 
(1977, 1991), the developing self needs mirroring others to confirm it, to reflect back to 
the child hislher own appearance, hislher own being, in order for the self to grow and 
develop, a capacity achieved through "empathic attunement". 
Further, Buber's understanding that persons have a need to relate to others and are 
primarily motivated by this need for connection, has also been put forward as an 
alternative to Freud's "pleasure principle" by psychoanalytic thinkers such as Fairbairn 
(1952), who argue that libido was essentially "object" seeking rather than pleasure 











drives, by claiming that the drives were pathways and means of connecting with others. 
These observations have been confirmed by the developmental observations of Bowlby, 
Stern and others, who postulate an inbuilt drive for connection and relation in the infant 
and young child (Mitchell, 1988). 
4.3 DIALOGUE AND AN IMAGE OF THE FULLY HUMAN 
An important contribution that Buber's work can make to the theory of psychotherapy is 
his image of what it means to be human and of the fully human person. This image of 
health is crucial to the therapeutic enterprise, as the concept of therapy invariably implies 
a model of health, maturity, and full human functioning as a goal to strive towards. 
However, as both Farber et al (1956) and Jung (1973) point out, most schools of therapy 
do not tackle this question directly and thus derive their conception of health from 
pathology rather than from any conception of what is fully human. They also derive their 
understanding of human health from an essentially reductive glance, leading to some 
rather technical and schizoid definitions of what it means to be a full functioning human 
being. Thus the image of health is perceived as, for example, Freud's "genital character 
with object relations" (as cited in Farber, 1956, p. 110), Sullivan's (1953) "syntaxic 
interperson" whose relationships are "consensually validated", Klein's (1985) "mature 
individual" who has managed to reach the "depressive position" by integrating the 
splitting of the "good object" and the "bad object", and so on. As Farber (1956) points 
out, therapists seriously need to question whether they themselves most aspire to these 
goals, or if perhaps they have built up system of thOUght that is not fit for human 
habitation and does not accurately capture the wholeness of life and the human being. 
Thus psychotherapeutic theory is in need of an image of the fully human that is not 
reductive or deduced from pathology, a theory that is able to answer Winnicott's (1986) 
famous question that he felt psychoanalysis has not faced: "What is life about, apart from 
illness?" While there have been some attempts in recent times towards answering this 
question, such as Maslow's (1954) conception of self-actualisation, Jung's (1973) 
concept of individuation and Winnicott's (1986) understanding of the creative individual 











conceptions are defined in tenns of the individuaL This is where Buber's philosophy of 
dialogue can make a contribution to the field, as it provides an image of what life is about 
and of the fully human in relational terms through his vision of the "life of dialogue,,6. 
As we have already seen, for Buber life is about living a dialogue with the world and the 
people we meet. Life is about being open to the other, hearing the call of each moment 
and responding to it with one's whole self. In the dialogical life, characterised by the 1-
Thou relationship, each moment is precious and has, "like a new born baby, a new face, 
that has never been before and will never be again" (Buber, 1963a, p. 143). It must 
therefore be lived in the present. "It demands of you a reaction that cannot be prepared 
beforehand. It demands nothing of which is past. It demands presence, responsibility; it 
demands you" (1963a, p. 143). Thus for Buber the fully human person is one who is able 
to live a life of dialogue, to be present and hear the call of each moment, and respond to it 
with one's whole being7. This is the person who has "existential trust" (Buber, 1967d), 
the individual who has the courage to be open to the address of the moment, hear its call 
and respond. It is the person capable of spontaneity and surprise, and able to bear the 
anxiety created by the "holy insecurity" of living without a definite answer to life, a 
person open to new learning, to new understanding, and to change. It is the person who 
has the courage to be authentic and say what slhe feels in his/her dealings with others, yet 
at the same time to be open to others as they are. 
Thus Buber's ideas provide an overarching philosophy and image of health and meaning, 
and an image ofthe fully human person as one living a life of dialogue. They also 
provide an image of the highest fonn of relationship that can exist between human 
6 This is not to ignore the important contribution that intersubjectivity theory in psychoanalysis has made to 
the area of dialogue. However, Buber's understanding of dialogue as a way of life involving "existential 
trust" has a slightly different emphasis. 
7 This notion of life as a series of dialogical situations is both important and alien to our increasingly 
impersonalised world, where the individual has lost significance and the sphere oft-It relation is dominant 
Buber argued against this impersonal understanding of the world, and for an understanding of life as 












beings, that of the I-Thou relationship, where two people truly meet each other without 
losing their own authenticity and sense of identity, a relationship without pretence or 
seeming, characterised by unreservedness, authenticity and spontaneity, where both 
parties are mutually affected and changed, where both parties grow and as a result of the 
relationship, become something they were not before it. This is a relationship 
characterised by an attitude of partnership between subjects rather than using or 
manipulating the other as an object. 
This vision ofBuber's corresponds with recent attempts in the field of inter subjective 
psychoanalysis to correct early relational theory in the field of psychoanalysis, which 
suffered from the criticism that "it is objects and not others that are talked about" (Laing, 
as cited by Guntrip, 1980, p. 387). Buber's work shows that the preoccupation with 
others as objects in early relational theorising belongs to a specific type of relation - the 
I-It relation (Brice, 1984). However, as Guntrip (1980) argues, while early relational 
psychoanalysis studied this type of pathological relationship, where "one uses the other 
rather than relates personally to the other" in depth, it failed to provide an understanding 
of healthy mature relationships where one can know and be known by the other, or in 
Benjamin's terms, where one can "recognise" the other and "be recognised" (1992, p. 
45). Current intersubjectivity theory has attempted to correct this balance so that "where 
objects where, subjects must be" (Benjamin, 1992, p. 44), and in doing so has 
increasingly begun to explore what Buber would refer to as I-Thou mode of relating. 
Thus Buber's philosophy provides a means of understanding this tension in current 
relational psychoanalysis as developing from the two essential modes of relating that are 
available to human beings. 
4.4 SICKNESS AS MONOLOGUE 
"In every human being there is probably to some extent, a lonely person at heart, but in 
the very ill, it is an utterly isolated being, too denuded of experience loreellike a person, 
unable to communicate with others and never reached by others" (Guntrip, as cited by 











"[ am isolated. [ sit in a glass ball, [ see people through a glass wall. [scream, but they 
do not hear me" (Ellen West, as cited by Rogers, 1980). 
Buber, because he was more interested in health than sickness, did not elaborate much on 
the implications of his theory of dialogue for pathology, yet his philosophy of dialogue 
implies an understanding of what pathology is, which one can derive from his image of 
health. Ifhealth lies in the life of dialogue, then it follows that pathology involves an 
inability to enter into dialogue with the things and beings one comes into contact with in 
life. Thus pathology can be defined as a life of monologue, where dialogical living is cut 
off and becomes impaired. The individual begins to live in a shut-in, closed world, sealed 
off from seeing in the way others see. The more extreme the pathology is, the more 
difficult it becomes for one to meet and connect with others. Yet let us explore this a little 
further, and draw out its implications for a dialogical understanding of both neurosis and 
psychosis. 
4.4.1 Understanding of Neurosis 
Hans Trub, a Jungian therapist very much influenced by Buber's philosophy and who 
worked primarily with neurotic patients in long-term depth therapy, was the first to 
develop Buber's ideas in order to understand neurosis. For Trub (1964), the neurotic 
person reacts to reality, but is no longer open to it. The result of this flight from reality is 
a profound and inexplicable anxiety out of which the patient constructs a system of 
powerful protections and defences that can barely be penetrated by others. These 
defences serve to protect the patient, yet also lead to the living of a shut-in or narrowed 
down existence, a life of "monologue" where the meeting with others and with new 
experiences becomes increasingly unlikely. The patient like all other beings has a need 
for dialogue; yet entering into dialogue involves a risk and creates anxiety, thus leading 
to incapacity for it. For Trub neurosis is precisely this inability to go out and meet the 
world, to engage in a dialogue with others, in order to protect the self, and the patient's 
symptoms are the defenses employed to prevent the meeting or dialogue. Therefore the 











course within narrow confines, not daring to move out into the wider areas that could be 
encompassed by personal life" (Angyal, 1965, p. 76). 
4.4.2 Vignette Two 
This understanding of neurosis as emerging from a powerful system of defenses that 
leads to a narrowed existence and the withdrawal of the self from the meeting with the 
world is well-illustrated by a patient I saw weekly in my second year of training. The 
patient, a 40-year-old housewife, had corne to therapy because of feelings of resentment, 
depression and obsessional anxiety about her children' safety. She felt her life had no 
meaning and purpose other than to, as she put it, "serve" her family. She described a life 
where her every activity was related to looking after her children and husband. There was 
no activity outside ofthis narrow existence. She blamed her family for this, and would 
fall into regular ruminations that were resentful in content. 
When it was pointed out that she needed to re-engage with the world outside of her 
family she readily agreed. However, this proved more difficult that she thought, and her 
anxiety about moving out of the narrow confines of her existence quickly emerged. She 
displaced this anxiety onto her children, stating that she could not have others look after 
them, even other family members that she claimed to trust. In essence she was using her 
family as a rationalisation for her avoidance of contact with the outside world. Slowly, by 
pointing this out, the therapy began to progress, and she gradually began to re-engage 
with the world beyond her family. She did this by resuming a dialogue with her great 
passion in life, her photography. She was encouraged to begin by taking pictures of her 
children, which she did. However, she refused to show these pictures to anyone. The 
therapeutic relationship helped bridge her isolation, and eventually enough trust was 
developed for her to show me the pictures. This was a major step for her, and represented 
the beginnings of a dialogue with the outside world. Gradually, she began to show her 
pictures to others and to take photographs of people and things outside of her family. By 
the time of our last session, her anxiety about her children, while still present, had been 











4.4.3 Understanding of Psychosis 
Thus the neurotic is one who has sacrificed his/her capacity for dialogue in withdrawing 
his/her self from the meeting with the world and constructing a large array of defenses in 
order to avoid the meeting or dialogue with the world and with others. When this defense 
is carried to its extreme there is intense isolation and inner phantasy begins to take over, 
so that the distinction between inside and outside, between self and other, between I and 
Thou is lost, and psychosis develops. Psychosis is thus the sickness that develops from 
extreme self-isolation and total loss of capacity for meeting others, an insight confirmed 
by both therapists working with psychotics, such as Fromm-Reichmann (1959), and 
research which describes a prodromal stage of schizophrenia that contains these very 
features of withdrawal and isolation. This results in an inner fantasy world subsuming 
reality, which leads to a fixed monological system of delusions that cannot be penetrated 
and are not open to feedback from the outside world, finding its most extreme form in the 
paranoid type schizophrenic (Buber, 1965c). 
Thus in Buber's terms, psychosis develops from "I-solitude" and the loss of the Thou. 
Many manifestations of psychoses can be understood as the person's attempts to avoid 
this unbearable loneliness by creating a fictitious Thou (Buber, 1970), so that a person 
begins to conduct an imaginary dialogue with the world where others are given intentions 
and thoughts that are really those of the self, or voices are created that conduct an inner 
dialogue of fantasy to replace the lost dialogue of reality. Psychotic symptoms are 
therefore an expression of both the individual's loss of capacity to relate to another Thou, 
and his/her desperate attempts to make up for this loss through the creation of a fictitious 
Thou. 
4.5 THE THERAPUETIC DIRECTION AND GOAL 
Thus Buber's philosophy of dialogue provides an understanding of fully human 
functioning, of healthy mature relationships, and of pathology. This understanding of 
health and illness in turn gives an understanding of the direction and goal of therapy, 











unlocking of the locked up person for meeting with the workr. In therapy the patient 
moves gradually from a situation of monologue and from an I-it pole of relating to others, 
to a situation of dialogue and an I-Thou pole of relating. The therapist's means of 
assessing this is through the therapeutic relationship, and progress is indicated by 
increasing moments of authentic meeting. When the patient is finally able to relate to the 
therapist as a Thou and the relationship reaches a level of full mutuality, the therapy, as 
Buber (1965c) argues, is complete and the patient has been "cured" . Yet how is this goal 
achieved and what is the agent of change in therapy? 
4.6 MEETING AS THE AGENT OF CHANGE AND HEALING: 
"We live on the hope that authentic human meeting between human beings can occur" 
(RD Laing, as cited by Guntrip, 1980, p. 352). 
For Buber and for those who have extended his ideas further in the field of 
psychotherapy, healing and growth is achieved through the therapeutic relationship, 
which aims to develop into a dialogue by the process of increasing moments of contact 
and meeting (I-Thou moments) between therapist and patient. It is in the "immediacy of 
human standing over against one another" (Buber, 1967 c, p. 142) that the patient's 
isolation and self-encapsulation can be broken through, and a transformed, healed 
relationship can be achieved. While every therapist needs methodology, technique and 
theory, which provide a sense of orientation and integration to the patient and therapist 
that both cannot do withoue, it is not through this I-It mode of relating that real healing 
takes place. Rather, healing takes place in the "between", and is achieved through 
moments ofI-Thou meeting between patient and therapist that take place in the 
therapeutic relationship. Such moments cannot be planned or willed, they occur 
spontaneously and the therapist can only remain open to them so that when they do come 
they can be seized. It is only in such moments of personal and authentic encounter 
~ As illustrated by vignette two. 
9 Theory, method and teehnique refer to the I-It mode of therapeutic relation, and, as stated earlier, Suber 
argued that such a mode of relation is both necessary and unavoidable in any relationship, as one cannot 
sustain I -Thou modes of relating due to their intensity and lack of orderlboundaries. Thus therapy can be 
conceived as an interaction ofl-It and I-Thou modes of relating. The question really is which is given 












between therapist and patient that real healing, that of the "atrophied personal center", 
can take place. 
As Friedman (1985) points out, while all therapy to a greater or lesser extent relies on the 
meeting between therapist and patient, only a few have singled out the meeting as central 
and have recognized the importance of meeting as the agent of change and transfonnation 
in therapy. Yet these have included some very experienced and effective therapists, as the 
following quotes indicate: 
"In those rare moments when a deep realness in one meets a deep realness in the 
other, it is a memorable I-Thou relationship ... such a deep and mutual personal 
encounter is experienced by me as very growth enhancing" (Rogers, 1980, p. 9). 
"Only when the therapist finds the person behind the patient's defences, and 
perhaps the patient finds the person behind the therapist's defences, does true 
psychotherapy happen. What is therapeutic, when it is achieved, is the moment of 
'real meeting' of two persons ... This I regard also as ideally the goal of 
psychotherapy" (Guntrip, 1980, p. 352 -354). 
"One can aptly speak of human meeting as the actual agent. .. in psychoanalytic 
treatment. .. Within the framework of psychotherapy, the methodology and 
technique applied at any given time is least effective of all; rather it is the human 
relationship between physician and patient that is determining" (Victor Frankl, as 
cited by Friedman, 1985, p. 2). 
"The very heart of psychotherapy is a caring, deeply human meeting between two 
people" Yalom (1989, p.13). 
"Of particular importance is the moment of "meeting" in which participants 
interact in a way that creates a new, implicit intersubjective understanding of their 
relationship and pennits a new-way-of-being-with-the-other. We view moments 











Yet why has the healing that takes place through moments of authentic, personal, and 
genuine human contact between therapist and patient not been regarded as central in 
much of psychotherapy? This may be due to the fact that such a notion of healing 
challenges many of the orthodoxies, traditions, and assumptions of psychotherapy. 
Firstly it challenges psychotherapy's "psychologism" and concept of the isolated mind, 
by arguing that healing occurs in the "between" rather than within, which traditional 
psychotherapy has favoured, whether it be through "self-analysis", "self-exploration", 
"self-insight", or "cognitive restructuring". 
Secondly, as moments of meeting occur spontaneously and cannot be planned, it 
challenges the notion that technique and correct methodology are sufficient for healing, 
which psychotherapy, in its attempts to be a hard "science" and to allay the anxiety of 
therapists that have to encounter the mystery of the human being, has emphasised. 
Thirdly, for therapists that have been trained in the schools of psychoanalysis, it 
challenges the understanding of the therapeutic relationship as purely based on 
transference dynamics. This focus on the relationship as a vehicle for the transference, 
which can be used as a means of gaining insight into the patient's dynamics, precludes an 
entire sphere of relationship, the "real relationship". This overemphasis on the issue of 
transference and the problems it creates is well summarized by Anna Freud: 
"With due respect for the necessary strictest handling and interpretation of the 
transference, I still feel we should leave room somewhere for the realisation that 
analyst and patient are also two real people of equal adult status, in a real personal 
relationship to one another. I wonder whether, our - at times complete - neglect of 
this side of the matter is not responsible for some of the hostile reactions we get 
from our patients and which we are apt to ascribe to true transference only" 
(1954, p. 611). 
This overemphasis on the transference has led to the therapeutic relationship being 
treated as an "as if' phenomenon, one that analysed properly will facilitate other 











by the therapist, and having value in itself as a forms of healing. Such a notion prioritises 
the I-It sphere over the I-Thou, and meeting is seen as a means to greater insight and 
theoretical knowledge of the individual. However, the idea of healing through meeting 
reverses this order, arguing that method and theory should be used to serve the 
facilitation of meeting in the therapeutic relationship, which is primary. Therefore it 
challenges the notion of the therapeutic relationship as a means to a greater end by seeing 
the relationship as an end in itself. 
Fourthly, the concept that healing takes place through meeting argues for a more mutual 
and humane relationship that challenges the traditional notion of professional superiority 
and the authority and power of the therapeutic relationship. This is clear through Buber's 
comments that for such healing to take place, it is necessary that the therapist step out of 
the "closed room of psychological treatment" where s/he rules "by means of his 
systematic and methodological superiority" and go forth with the patient "into the air of 
the world where selfhood is opposed to selfhood" (1967c, p. 142). 
Fifthly, healing through meeting challenges the traditional notion of the optimal 
therapeutic stance as that ofthe "blank screen", that is ofthe therapist as a detached, 
neutral and wholly objective figure, who maintains a certain personal distance from the 
relationship. This position was taken on the basis of two arguments. Firstly, it was argued 
that direct spontaneous therapeutic involvement and engagement will interfere with the 
natural unfolding of the transference that requires a blank screen upon which the patient 
can transfer feelings 10. Secondly it was argued that if the therapist took a personal stance 
in relation to the patient and abandoned the professional, detached role s/he would lose 
objectivity and be swept away by the patient's needs and neuroses. In this respect Freud 
writes: 
10 The validity of this notion has been challenged in both self-psychology and the intersubjective school of 
psychoanalysis. Their counter-argument, well-summarised by Maroda (1991), is that there is increasing 
evidence that the unresponsive, detached, neutral, therapist, may actually distort and inhibit the 
transference, by making the patient more narcissistic or rageful than s/he really is by denying them the 
opportunity for a real human relationship. Thus the traditional role may bias the transference in the 












"The patient would achieve her aim but the doctor would never achieve his. What 
would happen to the doctor and patient would be what happened, according to the 
amusing anecdote, to the pastor and the insurance agent. The insurance agent, a 
free thinker, lay at the point of death and his relatives insisted on bringing in a 
man of God to convert him before he died. The interview lasted so long that those 
who waited outside began to have hopes. At last the door of the sick-chamber 
opened. The free thinker had not been converted; but the pastor went away 
insured 1 I" (as cited in Yalom, 1980, p. 411). 
These two arguments paved the way for generations of psychotherapeutic technique that 
argued against an authentic encounter between therapist and patient and insisted that the 
therapist's primary and sole function was that of interpretation, However, these 
arguments stem from the fundamental mistake of not realising the importance of the here 
and now relationship for healing and from placing the achievement of insight above that 
of interhuman connection, a mistake that comes from the traditional view's privileging of 
"healing within" over "healing between". In contrast the approach of healing through 
meeting argues that the optimal therapeutic stance is one of personal engagement, where 
the therapist directly engages with the patient in a personal and immediate manner, and 
the therapist's ability to heal lies in his/her ability to do this, 
4.7 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER FOUR: 
Thus it is the therapist's task to relate deeply, fully and personally to the patient, to 
"meet" the patient, and this is what creates healing. While therapy involves a constant 
and necessary interplay ofI-Thou and I-It modes of relating, it is the former that are 
given priority and theory and method are subordinated to the facilitation of the 
relationship rather than the other way around. Therefore the therapist's ability to form the 
1-Thou relation is crucial and perhaps the most important capacity for the therapist to 
II This passage may reveal the real, unconscious reason for Freud's and other psychotherapists' argument 
against a personal engagement with the patient, that is the fear that this would involve an opening up to the 
patient in a way that the patient may personally affect the analyst and lead to him/her being overwhelmed 
by the patient's pathology, Thus the detached professional stance serves as a protective shield for the 
therapist (Maroda, 1991, 16), While such protection may be neeessary at times, it is important to recognize 











have (Jacoby, 1984). This in tum raises the question of how this can be achieved and 
what qualities are needed in the therapist for the I-Thou relationship and dialogue to be 
fostered. Further, what are possible blocks to dialogue that can manifest in the therapeutic 












RELEVANCE OF BUBER'S THOUGHT FOR THE PRACTISE OF 
PSYCHOTHERAPY 
5.1 THE PARADOX OF DIALOGUE 
Thus in Buber's understanding of therapy, healing occurs in the "between" through the 
act of meeting and dialogue. This raises a number of interesting questions for practice, 
such as how such moments of meeting can be achieved in therapy, and what the blocks to 
such moments may be. Before this is explored it is important to point out the paradox and 
difficulty of the dialogical method of healing, which is that, as Buber (1970) points out, 
true dialogue cannot be induced or willed, and it eludes the therapist who directly tries to 
achieve it. This is a trap that therapists who seek to employ Buber's understanding of 
therapy may fall into, and it is well summarised by Heard (1993), who has clearly 
struggled with this issue: 
"When I have sought a dialogue by struggling both to be present to the client and 
to make the client present, I have always encountered a kind of frustration that is 
disheartening. As I have learned to relax and allow my experience of the client in 
all his mystery to come to my being without analysis or contemplation, something 
happens. The effect of this something is the work of the between ... There has been 
a dialogue ... It is in the fleeting moments, when therapist and client enter the 
between that the true work of healing is done" (p. 31). 
Thus moments of meeting and dialogue are fleeting and not in control of the therapist. 
They cannot be planned or developed. This leads Friedman (1972), to argue that such 
moments come as an "act of grace" and that the therapist can only be open so that when 
the moment for such meeting occurs, the therapist is able to meet the patient in the 
moment. The therapist must be willing to accommodate the unpredictable and uncertain 
nature of the dialogical process. While recent therapeutic approaches attempt to reduce 
healing to the application of techniques that evolve from certain theoretical and empirical 











Therefore there is no technique for healing through meeting, all that can be pointed to are 
some basic preconditions that are needed for the dialogue to unfold in therapy, and 
possible situations that prevent it from occurring. 
5.2 EXISTENTIAL COURAGE: A WAY OF BEING 
In his discussion of the qualities needed in the therapist, Buber (1967 d) emphasises the 
quality of openness and receptivity, together with the therapist's readiness to respond to 
what the patient will bring to the therapy room. This Buber labels as the therapist's 
capacity for "existential trust", which he argues is the most essential thing a therapist 
should have. In essence, this existential trust can be divided into two parts, the courage to 
remain open to the moment and to each patient as unique, and the courage to respond 
with one's whole being to what one hears, sees and feels (Friedman, 1972). 
5.2.1 The Courage to be Open to the Address of the Moment 
"Discard your memory; discard the future tense of your desire; forget them both, 
both what you knew and what you want, to leave space for a new idea" (Eion, as 
cited in Casement, 1991, p. 222). 
Firstly, Buber argues that the therapist must be able to be open and "await the 
unexpected" (1967 c, p. 167). He should leave the patient to his/her self, and "be ready to 
receive what he will receive" (1967c, p. 167). It is only in this way that the therapist will 
be able to treat each patient as unique and personal and allow space for the spontaneity of 
dialogue and I-Thou moments of meeting to occur. This is the therapist who "does not 
want something precise" and is "in the hands of his patient. .. ready to be surprised" 
(1967d, p. 167). The therapist needs to always be open to the otherness of the patient, 
realizing Yalom's dictum that "the enabling relationship always assumes that the other is 
never fully knowable" (1989, p. 185). This enables the therapist to treat each case on its 
own merits and allows for, in lung's words, the "individual understanding" that is 
necessary for successful therapy and for moments of meeting (lung, 1975, p. 12). Such 











school on the patient, and allows for the space in which the patient can unfold in his/her 
. 12 umque way. 
Yet in order to do this the therapist has to be able to bear the anxiety, referred to by Buber 
as "holy insecurity", that this involves. The major task of the therapist is to learn to 
tolerate uncertainty, to learn to tolerate "not knowing" (Casement, 1991). To do this the 
therapist has to be "capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any 
irritable reaching after fact and reason" (Keats, as cited by Casement, 1991, p. 223). 
Ideally, the therapist of holy insecurity would be elementally open in order to allow for 
the possibility of meeting the patient as s/he truly is, which can only occur, according to 
Buber, as a moment of surprise and spontaneity. This is the first part of existential 
courage. 
One of the common misunderstandings of this approach is that it implies that a theory 
and methodology is not necessary in psychotherapy. It is therefore important to point out 
that Buber (1967 d) argued that therapeutic methods, techniques and theories were 
necessary, as "no doctor could do without them". For Buber the problem emerges when 
the therapist unconsciously imposes his/her theories and methods on the patient, thus not 
allowing them to unfold naturally, or when the therapist in his/her quest for certainty, 
holds onto these theories and techniques so tightly that it interferes with the capacity to 
meet the other person and distorts listening by creating presuppositions and stereotypes 
that get in the way a personal understanding of the patient. The therapist is, of course, 
tempted to do this because it gives a sense of orientation and an illusion of knowing and 
mastery that alleviates the anxiety of the therapeutic situation, yet the cost of achieving 
this illusory sense of certainty is high, as "such beliefs may block the uncertain and 
spontaneous encounter necessary for effective therapy ... " (Yalom, 1989, p.13) 
12 Winnicott (1958) explores this concept of allowing the patient to unfold in his understanding of analysis 
as a process, which in each patient has its own pace and which follows its own course, if the therapist is 
open to this and does not impose premature interpretations on the patient. For further analysis of the 











5.2.2 The Courage to Respond 
"For genuine dialogue to take place one must be willing on each occasion to say what is 
really in his mind about the subject of conversation ... No-one ... can know in advance 
what it is that he has to say ... " (Euber, J965a, 85-87). 
Secondly, the therapist needs the courage to respond to that which swells up in himJher in 
response to the patient, which is referred to the "counter-transference" in analytic 
therapy. Yet for the therapist to do this s/he must have the courage to bring hislher whole 
self to the relationship, the courage to respond to the dialogue with the patient without 
reservation. The therapist thus has to avoid seeming and pretence, and must be able have 
the courage to address the other and respond to the other in an authentic fashion. Rogers 
argues that this authentic presence of the therapist in the relationship is the most 
important factor in therapy. Rogers writes: 
"Personal growth is facilitated when the counselor is what he is, when in the 
relationship with his client he is genuine and without "front" or fa9ade, openly 
being the feelings and attitudes which at the moment are flowing in him ... It 
means he comes into direct personal encounter with his client, meeting him on a 
person to person basis. It means that he is being himself: not denying himself' 
(1967, p. 90). 
This description implies that a necessary quality for the therapist in the therapeutic 
relationship is that of open communication and self-disclosure. For a relationship 
characterised by immediacy and openness to develop it is essential that the therapist take 
the lead in this respect, by displaying these qualities and thus communicating 
existentially a way of being to the patient 13 • This way of being in the relationship is 
characterized by Jourard in his description of moments of meeting with the patient that 
occurred when he spontaneously responded in an authentic and personal way to the 
patient: 











"Also there came to me recollections of instances where I had violated what I 
thought were technical rules, for example, holding a weeping patient's hand or 
bursting out laughing at something the patient had said, and of patients later 
telling me that when I had done these things, I somehow became human, a person, 
and that these were significant moments for the patients in the course of 
therapy ... I find myself sometimes giving advice, lecturing, laughing, becoming 
angry, interpreting, telling my fantasies, asking questions, in short, doing 
whatever occurs to me during the therapeutic session in re$ponse to the other 
person . .. " (1971, p. 146-147). 
In the above Jourard describes the courage to respond to the other with one's whole 
being. The advantages of this ability to respond to the address of the patient are many: it 
can help confirm a patient's sense of reality, it establishes the therapist's honesty and 
authenticity, it establishes the therapist's humanness and thus allows for a space where 
the patient can also bring his/her human qualities, and it can help clarify the way the 
patient impacts on people (Maroda, 1991). However, the most important factor from 
Buber's perspective is that it helps create meeting in the therapeutic relationship, which 
in turn is what produces change and healing. 
A possible misunderstanding ofthis ability to respond to the patient is that it implies that 
the therapist can irresponsibly react to the patient and act out any thoughts that come into 
his/her mind. However, as Friedman (1972) points out, true response is not reaction, and 
in the situation of therapy the therapist must meet the patient in the context of a genuine 
concern and commitment to promote the growth and healing of the patient, and this is the 
essential responsibility of the therapist, which guides all other responses. Therefore it 
follows that therapists may have to keep some things to themselves, which, on the basis 
of their training, may be destructive to the patient, that they must respect the timing and 
attend to the pace of therapy, to what a patient is or is not ready to hear. The therapist 
constantly has to walk this "narrow ridge" between spontaneity and the genuine care and 
concern for the patients well being, and hold the tension between them. There is no other 











Therefore the essential factor needed in the therapist in order to allow for the possibility 
of dialogue and meeting to occur in therapy is "existential trust", which is divided into 
the courage to remain open to the address of the moment and the unique otherness of 
each patient, and the courage to respond to the address of the other with one's whole 
being, and without pretense or seeming. However, such an openness and courage are not 
easy, and there are many barriers to this way of being, which can stem from both the 
therapist and from psychoanalytic theory. Two of these will now be explored. 
5.2.3 Two Barriers to Existential Trust in the Therapeutic Situation 
''I'm doubtful about this. Do you mean that the patient is the cause of the meeting's not 
taking place? There are certain difficulties on the side of the patient, and some, perhaps 
not less, on the side of the therapist" (Buber, 1967c. 170). 
5.2.3.1 The Therapist's Anxiety and Need for Control as a Barrier to Openness: 
Buber argues the primary quality needed for openness to the address of the moment is the 
ability to bear the "holy insecurity" such openness creates (Friedman, 1991). It therefore 
follows that at the root of the therapist's difficulty in being open to the patient and to 
each moment in therapy is the anxiety that such openness creates. Openness to each 
patient and to allowing the patient to unfold requires the therapist to surrender control of 
the therapy to the patient (Casement, 1991). As is well known, control is a defense 
against anxiety, and thus the therapist who is unable to contain anxiety will be unable to 
surrender this control. The sources of the therapist's anxiety are numerous. The therapist 
may fear being incompetent, which results in is his/her need to be right at all times. Thus 
old ways of understanding the patient are rigidly held onto. Another anxiety may be 
related to a fear of failure and the need for the therapy to be a success, that is from a 
desire on the therapist's part which is essential to his/her sense of self and may be 
threatened by a patient who is not getting better. This may result in greater imposition of 
the therapist in the form of increasing interpretations or interventions that impose on the 











to contain anxiety is crucial to the therapy and an inability to do this prevents the 
openness required for the dialogue to take place. 
5.2.3.2 Orthodox and Contemporary Psychoanalytic Theory as a Barrier to Spontaneous 
Response: 
Many of the barriers to spontaneous and whole-hearted responding in the therapist come 
from orthodox psychoanalytic theory, which tends to severely restrict the therapist in his/ 
her range of responses to the patient (Maroda, 1991). This has resulted in many therapists 
having to reduce or check natural and spontaneous responses that can help produce 
meeting and dialogue in the therapeutic relationship. The end result is that the therapist 
plays a passive role and maintains an 'incognito' that does not help the development of 
meeting and dialogue in therapy. 
The first argument made by orthodox psychoanalytic theory that interferes with the 
therapist's capacity for spontaneous response is that such response will interfere with the 
unfolding ofthe transference. Yet, as we have explored, this notion is currently under 
attack and it is argued that a detached, non-responsive therapist interferes with the 
transference in a more destructive manner (Maroda, 1991). Another argument made by 
orthodox psychoanalytic theory that reduces the therapist's ability to respond 
spontaneously to the patient is that if therapists are open and authentic in their responses 
to patients they may burden the patient by "acting out" their own unconscious conflicts or 
needs, or they may fail the patient by being pressured into acting out previous traumas 
and relationships (Maroda, 1991). This has led to situations where the therapist contains 
and intellectualises all parts of the relationship, and withholds any kind of genuine, 
human response, often in the face of much anger, frustration and protest from the patient, 
for fear that it will be part of some type of acting out process. 
However, if we are to employ the understanding that healing comes through meeting 
than, while the therapist may act out some of his/her own needs to the extent that s/he is 
human 14, this is far less damaging than the mistrust created in the relationship by the 











silencing and dehumanisation of the therapist that this part of psychoanalytic theory 
creates. This understanding is also being argued by many contemporary psychoanalysts, 
who claim that the therapist's open disclosure of responses invoked by the patient are in 
fact beneficial and can help "re-establish varying degrees of contact, further activity, and 
greater hopefulness" (Tauber, as cited in Maroda, 1991,92), while also remaining loyal 
to the psychoanalytic dictum that the search for truth is the most essential quest in 
psychoanalysis. 
Thus the traditional arguments against the therapist's spontaneous engagement in the 
therapeutic relationship have seriously reduced the therapist's capacity to create dialogue 
and meeting in the analytic relationship. A more recent component of theory that has 
threatened the therapist's ability to be human and directly engaged in the therapeutic 
relationship is the increasing emphasis on the importance of the therapist as an object to 
the patient and serving as a function for the patient, whether it be holding, mirroring, or 
the provision of an "emotionally corrective experience". This immediately puts the 
therapist in the role of an "It", and precludes engagement with the patient as a genuine 
"Thou". It also closes down large avenues of communication for the therapist, who is 
confined to roles such as a "good enough mother" or "mirroring selfobject" and shuts 
down feelings and emotions that conflict with this role or function, such as anger, 
frustration, and other negative feelings. For the therapist who tries to fulfill the 
impossible role of having unconditional positive regard for the patient, such feelings 
induce guilt and are repressed and kept silent in the therapy. This creates what Winnicott 
(1949) refers to as the "sentimental environment", and sends out an unconscious message 
to the patient that such feelings are not allowed in the therapeutic relationship, thus 
creating barriers to authentic dialogue. 
Yet if we are to employ the understanding that healing comes through meeting rather than 
through a corrective emotional experience or the provision of an object that the patient 
did not have as a child, what is real about each person and what is happening between 
them is the highest priority, and this is more important than the therapist's constant 
training in the discipline of psychotherapy, which should enable himlher to learn to respond to others in the 











positive regard for the patient. This is where Buber's distinction between acceptance and 
confinnation is useful. For Buber, to take one's partner seriously is confinnation, and one 
can still confinn another even by opposing and challenging them. Such a notion of the 
basic essence of what the patient needs frees the therapist from an overemphasis on 
function or role, which may close down hislher capacity to relate as a person. Thus 
Buber's concept of confinnation allows the therapist to be therapeutic as a person rather 
than as a function or object in the therapeutic relationship. 
5.3 PATIENT AS THOU VERSUS PATIENT AS IT: A WAY OF SEEING 
For Buber, as has been shown, each person has a twofold nature: the abstracted general 
qualities which can be known by the person who has the ability to categorise, label, and 
analyse - the "It", and the concrete irreducibly unique qualities which are particular only 
to that person, his or her "Thou". For I-Thou meeting to take place, Buber argues that the 
therapist must be able to perceive the Thou of the other, and this means to be able to 
grasp the particular uniqueness of the other and avoid the temptation of turning the other 
into an It. Buber argues that for this to take place the therapist has to be turned to the 
patient in the spirit of partnership and not use the patient for hislher own needs, and slhe 
has to be able to practice the art of "imagining the real" of the other without reducing the 
other to some categorization or aspect of self. These are now examined in further detail, 
together with an exploration of some of the difficulties therapists may have with this 
particular presupposition for the establishment of an I-Thou relationship. 
Firstly, to perceive the patient as a Thou rather than an It the therapist needs to turn to the 
patient with an attitude of respect and partnership, as one person to another, rather than as 
a subject acting on, using and manipulating an object of treatment. The therapist would 
ideally be entering the relationship fully turned to the patient, that is interested in the 
growth of the patient as the goal of the therapy, and actively concerned with this for its 











see the other s/he must relate in a way that his/her own needs do not become prominent in 
the relationship 15. 
The second factor that is necessary to see the Thou of the patient is that the therapist 
needs to be able to see the patient as a whole person, "without abstraction or reduction", 
to be able to perceive the uniqueness of the other without trying to "contract the manifold 
person ... to some schematically surveyable and recurrent structures" (Buber, 1965a, p. 
81). The therapist has to be able to "imagine the real" and "experience the other side", 
that is enter the patient's world to understand what they are thinking, experiencing and 
feeling from within, so that the patient can become present in his/her wholeness as a 
"living process". Yet there are a number of factors on the therapist's part that can prevent 
this from occurring in the therapy, which will now be explored. 
5.3.1 Three Barriers to Seeing the Thou of the Patient 
5.3.l.1 Therapist use of Patient as Object: 
The therapist may turn the patient into an object if s/he begins to use the patient for 
hislher own needs. The needs that the patient may fulfill are numerous: For the 
academically oriented therapist, the patient may be treated as an object of research. For 
the narcissistically vulnerable therapist, the patient may be used as an object for the 
regulation of the therapist's own self-esteem and sense of competence. For the 
voyeuristic therapist the patient may be used as an object for the therapist's own curiosity 
and as a means of living vicariously through the patient those sides of life that slhe cannot 
or does not live (Jacoby, 1984), and finally for the "messianic" therapist, patients may be 
15 This type of attitude towards the other is well-described by Fromm (1963), in his description of love 
characterised by "care", "respect" and "responsibility" that is achieved by the "productive character" and 
Maslow's (1968) understanding of the relations of the growth-motivated individual, who are less dependant 
and needful of other's praise and affection, and thus can truly tum to other, without using the other as an 











used as a means of asserting one's own "saving" power. The ways and means by which 
the therapist can use the patient are many, but the crucial point is that when the therapy 
begins to take place as a means of serving the therapist's own needs, the patient begins to 
be treated as an It, and the Thou can no longer be seen. This is a danger that every 
therapist needs to be aware of and the therapist needs to be as conscious as possible about 
the ways in which slhe may use patients as objects in order to satisfy personal needs. 
5.3.1.2 Diagnosis: 
Another way in which a patient may be turned into an It is if the therapist holds to the 
reductive glance termed "diagnosis", and subsequently never lets go of this in the 
therapy. These diagnoses reduce the other to "a borderline personality", a " pre-oedipal 
injury", and so on. In short they reduce the person to an "abstract illness" rather than a 
whole, unique individual. Many individuals argue that such diagnoses and categorisation 
are necessary and serve a useful function in helping the therapist have some 
understanding of the patient slhe is dealing with. This is true to some extent, and 
diagnostic clusters can at times be useful in leading to an understanding of the patient. 
However, the question is one of priority and the difficulty emerges when the patient is 
fitted into the diagnostic cluster, rather than the diagnosis being used to have a greater 
understanding of the patient. When this occurs the therapist becomes selective or closed 
off to parts of the patient that do not confirm the diagnoses and begins to treat the 
diagnosis rather than the person. Yalom writes: 
"If we relate to people believing that we can categorise them, we will neither 
identify nor nurture the parts, the vital parts, of the other that transcend category" 
(Yalom, 1989, p. 185). 
As Yalom points out, there is substantial evidence that diagnostic and therapeutic labels 
when held onto too rigidly can impede or distort listening by creating presuppositions and 
stereotypes that get in the way of meeting and the personal understanding of the other 
(Yalom, 1980); in short they reduce the other to an object and result in an I-It relation 











being damaged, and the dialogue cannot advance. The therapist needs to always, as 
Yalom (1980) states, be open to the otherness of the other, realizing that the other is 
never fully knowable. This allows for the true openness to one's partner that leads to 
meeting his/her Thou. 
5.3.1.3 Overidentification and Losing One's Ground: 
As Friedman (1985) points out, there are two dangers that the therapist may fall into in 
hislher attempt to imagine the real of the patient. Firstly, the therapist may overidentifY 
with the patient in attempting to connect with the patient's experience, thus creating a 
situation whereby the therapist mixes up his/her own past experience of something with 
the patient's experience and thus misses the experience as the patient feels it. Secondly, 
in attempting to connect with the patient the therapist may lose track of his/her own 
reactions, thus leaving hislher ground rather than holding it. As Buber's (1 965a) concept 
of "inclusion" implies, the therapist must be capable of an involved but detached 
presence, and must be able to be in two places at once at his or her own side and the 
patient's side. This is described by Katz (1963) as the "the pendulum between empathy 
and objectivity", by Jacoby (1984) as the capacity to have "one foot in" (the ability to 
"imagine the real") and "one foot out" (the ability to remain aware of the situation from 
the perspective of the therapist). The dialogue cannot take place without both these 
factors, and the therapist has to walk a "narrow ridge" between them. 
5.4 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER FIVE 
Therefore, while dialogue cannot be induced by the therapist, and there are no technical 
rules by which it can be created, the therapist can allow for the possibility of dialogue by 
having existential trust, that is the courage to be open to the address of the moment and 
the unique in the patient, and the courage to respond to what one hears and feels with 
one's whole being. This attitude of existential trust may be hampered by the therapist's 
inability to contain the anxiety induced by such a position, which leads to a need for 
certainty and imposition of theory upon the therapeutic process. It is also threatened by 











therapist's capacity to respond in an open, authentic and personal way to what the patient 
evokes in him/her. The therapist also needs to be able to see the patient as a Thou, rather 
than an object, and to do this slhe needs to relate to the patient in a way that personal 
needs do not become dominant in the therapy, while also having the ability to imagine the 
real for the patient and experience the other side. Difficulties with this occur when the 
therapist turns the patient into an It, either by using the patient for the fulfillment of 
hislher own needs or by reducing the patient to a diagnostic category. A further danger is 
that, in the process oftrying to imagine the real, the therapist over-identifies with the 













6.1 CHALLENGES TO TRADITIONAL NOTIONS 
Buber's philosophy of dialogue and thoughts on psychotherapy present an interesting 
perspective on what psychotherapy is and how it works. In sum, Buber argues that while 
the traditional methods of analysis in psychotherapy are necessary and do provide some 
relief of symptoms and some orientation and integration for both therapist and patient, the 
healing of the "atrophied personal center" of the patient can only come about through the 
event of meeting that occurs in moments ofI-Thou relation. Thus he argues that the 
therapeutic relationship should be seen as an end in itself and the meeting between 
therapist and patient should be seen as the goal of therapy to which all theory and 
technique should be subordinated. This, as we have seen, presents a strong challenge to 
the orthodox notion of the therapy relationship as the means to a greater end, that is, as a 
means to insight into the patient's unconscious dynamics. 
Further, Buber argued that for moments of meeting to happen the therapist has to, at 
some point, leave the role of therapist and the security of technique and method, to meet 
the patient in the immediacy of one human being to another. The therapist must have the 
existential trust needed to be open to such moments and to be able to respond to them 
with his/her whole being. In this respect Buber argues for a more mutual, immediate, and 
equal relationship between therapist and patient l6, seeing both as ultimately struggling on 
in the hope of finally meeting each other. By doing so he also challenges the traditional 
notion of the optimal therapeutic stance as being one of detached neutrality and 
objectivity, with little personal engagement. 
16 However Suber (1965c) argued that the relation could never be fully mutual, as the situation of therapy 
placed a limitation on the mutuality of the therapeutic relationship. The situation of therapy was that the 
patient had come to the therapist for help and not vice versa, and this immediately limited a fully mutual 
relationship. However, at the same time, he argued that an I-Thou relationship in therapy was possible, 











Finally, Buber argues that for healing to take place there must be an understanding of 
each patient as a unique, whole individual, and that to reduce the patient to theoretical 
structures or diagnostic categories are a barrier to this way of seeing. This understanding 
of the patient as unique and whole is achieved through the method of "imagining the 
real" and "experiencing the other side". In this sense his perspective opposes the 
traditional psychiatric literature and the traditional understanding of the patient in 
psychoanalytic theory, which are both, at times, guilty of employing a glance that reduces 
the individual to the category of an abstract illness or theoretical construct. 
6.2 CRITIQUE OF BUBER 
One criticism that can be made ofBuber's approach is that it is a naive and romantic 
view that lacks an empirical basis and has been put forward by an individual with little 
experience of therapy. However, recent movements in contemporary psychoanalytic 
theory have confirmed Buber's understanding. Increasingly, infant-based research 
confirms Buber's insights into the primacy ofthe "between" or intersubjective sphere and 
the fallacy of the isolated mind (see Tronick, 1998). Various voices in the relational 
perspective are also arguing against the detached, impersonal therapeutic stance and for 
greater personal engagement between therapist and patient on the basis of clinical 
experience (see Maroda, 1991). His insights into healing through meeting in therapy have 
also been confirmed by recent movements in developmentally based contemporary 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy which argues for a similar understanding of what creates 
change in therapy in their conception of change as occurring through "moments of 
meeting" that come from the therapist's capacity to respond to "now moments" in 
therapy (Stem, 1998). They argue that an ability to be open and receptive, to be surprised, 
is essential if the therapists is to become aware of "now" moments, which step out of the 
familiar method of "moving along" in therapyl7. Further, for this moment to be turned 
into a moment of meeting, it requires an authentic and personal response from the 
17 In Suber's tenninology "moments of meeting" correspond to the I-Thou mode of relation, while "moving 
along" corresponds to the I-It mode of relation. The key in both Stern and Suber's arguments is that the I-It 











therapist, which "cannot be an application of technique nor an habitual therapeutic move" 
(Stern, 1998, p. 305). 
Thus Buber's insights continue to gain ground in recent changes in psychotherapeutic 
theory and practice. However, a further criticism against Buber, which perhaps has more 
validity, is that while he argues that every therapist needs a methodology and typology 
and that "without methods one is a dilettante", he does not explain how method can be 
used in conjunction with the spontaneity and surprise that moments of meeting require. 
There seems to be an inherent contradiction in Buber's thought. On the one hand he 
argues for spontaneity and surprise, on the other he argues that method and typology are 
required. This corresponds to the essence of Buber's philosophy, which is to hold the 
tensions between opposites rather than choose one side over another. Thus Buber argues 
for both method and spontaneity, both theory and surprise. Buber emphasised the I-Thou 
sphere of relation in his work on psychotherapy because he was concerned that there was 
a trend in orthodox theory, with its emphasis on method, technique and the reductive 
glance, towards an overvaluing of the I-It sphere that would lead to the loss of this 
tension. This may lead some to misunderstand him as being essentially anti-therapy and 
anti-method, which he was not. 
However, the criticism remains that Buber did not discuss how the therapist should hold 
the tension between theory and openness, between method and spontaneity, between 
dialogue and technique. Some of his followers have tried to work out this unanswered 
question. For Friedman (1996), the answer lies in the fact that the therapist's method 
must grow out ofhis/her meeting with the person and that the meeting and dialogue 
should be the primary consideration. For Trub (1964), the analytic method of pointing out 
and confronting defenses was necessary to move the patient to a stage where dialogue 
and meeting were once again possible. However, once this stage had been reached the 
therapist needed to step out of this method in order to meet the patient and thus complete 
the last stage of the healing. For Jourard (1971) the therapist's spontaneity must grow out 
of training in the discipline and method of psychoanalysis, which is required so that the 











in a therapeutic manner. Finally, for Hycner, while all psychotherapists need techniques, 
these should "arise out of the relationship" and not be "arbitrarily imposed on the 
situation" (1991, p. 45). The hidden unity of these approaches is an argument that all 
method and technique need to arise out of the dialogue of the therapeutic situation, rather 
than be imposed upon it. Technique and method need to arise out of the "between". Yet 
how would this work? 
6.2.1 Vignette Three 
Perhaps this can best be illustrated with a case example from my first year of training. I 
had been very eager to engage in psychodynamic therapy with my first "long term" 
individual patient, a 28-year-old student who had come to therapy due to feelings of 
depression and a drop in academic work. This individual was very rationally minded and 
seeking techniques to help him gain mastery over his emotions. Employing the dynamic 
method without letting our meetings decide what would work best, I immediately 
interpreted this as a controlling defense against unconscious anxiety. We met for a 
number of sessions and worked on understanding this anxiety, but he clearly was not 
engaged in the process. Finally, I allowed myself to listen to the dialogue he was trying to 
conduct with me. He was askingjhr techniques. Out of this evolved my response, which 
was to employ a cognitive analytic method of doing therapy that focused on techniques 
such as "cognitive restructuring" and "challenging core beliefs". To my surprise this 
moved the therapy along very quickly, while also helping to facilitate our meeting, which 
till now had not occurred due to my arbitrarily imposing a method on the therapeutic 
situation, rather than letting one grow out of it. 
In this way method and meeting were brought together in the therapy situation, while also 
growing out of one another. Thus it is important to note that Buber's approach does not 
imply that the therapist should not be taught method, theory and technique. Nor does it 
imply that there has to be a choice between these and dialogue in the therapy. Rather, his 
approach requires that the therapist walk a "narrow ridge" between these two opposites, 
holding the tension between them and always aware that there are moments beyond 











A further criticism ofBuber may be that he places too great a demand on the therapist. To 
be elementally open, to be in two places at once in the therapeutic relationship, to be able 
to respond to each and every patient in unique way, to be able to respond with one's 
whole being to all patients, this is asking too much of a therapist who sees many patients 
each day and has the limitations of being human. This criticism can be answered by 
pointing out that Buber never imagined that it was possible to remain in this way of being 
at all times, as one cannot sustain an I-Thou manner of relating. Thus the therapist will 
naturally float in and out of this way of being, and slowly build up his/her capacity for 
this. Yalom summarises this floating in and out: 
"I listen to a woman patient. She rambles on and on ... She is irritating. She has 
many off-putting gestures. She is not talking to me; she is talking 
in front of me. Yet how can she talk to me if I am not there? My thoughts wander. 
My head groans. What time is it? How much longer to go? I suddenly rebuke 
myself. I give my mind a shake. Whenever I think of how much time remains in 
the hour, I know I am failing my patient. I then try to touch her with my thoughts. 
I try to understand why I avoid her. What is her world like at this moment? How 
is she experiencing the hour? How is she experiencing me? I ask her these 
questions. I tell her that I have felt distant from her in the last several minutes. 
Has she felt the same way? We talk about that together and try to figure out why 
we lost contact with one another. Suddenly we are very close. She is no longer 
unattractive. I have much compassion for her as a person. For what she is, for 
what she might be. The clock races; the hour ends too soon" (1980, p. 415) 
Finally, a fourth critique of Buber's understanding of psychotherapeutic theory and 
practice is that, essentially, his work provides nothing new in the field. His ideas about 
openness have already been discussed by Bion, his work on imposition versus unfolding 
have been covered by the work of Winnicott and Rogers, his understanding of the 
"between" is currently being worked on by the intersubjectivists and others in relational 











therapy has being confinned by many sources, what is unique about his contribution is 
that his philosophy of dialogue and of I-Thou and I-It relations can help provide 
therapists with a broad coherent philosophy in which to place many of the insights 
provided by other therapists and schools. Further, it can also help provide an 
understanding of some of the essential tensions in the field: between "object" relations 
and "subject relations", between spontaneity and method, between abstract theory and 
individual understanding. It does this by placing these tensions within the context of the 
two essential spheres of human existence, the I-It and I-Thou sphere. It also argues that 
the therapist should walk a "narrow ridge" by holding the tensions between these 
opposites, rather than choose one side over the other. 
6.3 THE RELEVANCE OF BUBER'S WORK FOR PSYCHOTHERAPY AND 
SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
As Buber argued, to conduct a dialogue with life one has to be aware of the concrete 
historical hour in which one is placed. It would thus be contrary to his spirit to end this 
thesis without some thought on the relevance of his work for both psychotherapy and 
wider social issues in the South African context. In this respect one has to ask oneself 
what is the context in which both the country and psychotherapy finds itself? 
In tenns of South Africa's present and past, the country has confinned much of Buber's 
philosophy. The horror of apartheid, with its systems of categorisation, racism and 
divisions between peoples confinns his views of the evil that can occur when the other is 
dehumanised and related to as an It rather than as a Thou. Yet at the same time, the 
overcoming of these divisions, however briefly, through the dialogue that took place 
during the country's liberation from apartheid confinned his view that dialogue wins its 
true greatness "precisely there where two men without a strong spiritual ground, even of 
different kinds of spirit. .. even in the severest conflict. .. can each hold present to himself 
the experience side of the other" (as cited by Friedman, 1991, p. 417). 
Yet, while true dialogue was created out of the crises of apartheid, it has failed to 











become unbridgeable. These divisions still run deep and there is great mistrust between 
groups. While the Truth and Reconciliation process began bridging them, in the process 
of moving along since then the immediacy and directness of speech that is the hallmark 
of true dialogue has been lacking. The abyss grows deeper, and fear and resentment on 
both sides continually threaten dreams of a rainbow nation. 
In tenns of psychotherapy, it is a profession very much under attack in South Africa, and 
important questions have been asked about the relevance a profession, which is 
essentially western in its individualistic slant and for those with wealth due to its 
methodology, has for a country in which the majority of citizens are African and poor. 
What can psychotherapy provide to the country as a whole? Why should resources be 
placed in this area when there are other, greater concerns? 
Buber's philosophy of dialogue may be able to point out some answers to the questions 
faced by both the country at large and psychotherapy in particular. Firstly, his 
understanding of dialogue, of direct immediate communication involving existential trust 
and an ability to imagine the real of the other and experience the other side, together with 
his understanding of healing through meeting, can perhaps provide some guidance 
towards the path South Africa needs to take to overcome the divisions of its past. Yet 
how would such divisions be overcome? Buber writes: 
"That people no longer carry on authentic dialogue with one another is not only 
the most acute symptom of the pathology of our time, it is also that which most 
urgently makes a demand of us. I believe despite all, that the peoples in this hour 
can enter into a genuine dialogue with one another ... In a genuine dialogue each 
of the partners, even when he stands in opposition to the other, heeds, affinns and 
confinns his opponent as the existing other. Only so can conflict certainly not be 
eliminated from the world, but be humanely arbitrated and led towards its 
overcoming" (1957, p. 238). 
In tenns of the profession of psychotherapy Buber's understanding of therapy as 











meaning and relevance. In Buber's understanding, the psychotherapist is both a healer of 
the psyche and of the "between n. The psychotherapist is transfonned into a dialogical 
therapist, one who studies the sickness of the between and tries to help heal this area. In a 
country desperately in need of understanding how to trust again, to heal the sicknesses of 
the between created by apartheid and bridge the divisions, such a therapist would have 
the utmost relevance. Thus Buber's work may help provide psychotherapists, currently 
struggling with the question of their own relevance, with both a calling and purpose. If it 
could help to provide that, in however small a measure, it will have, in my opinion, 
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